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Editorial
In  a  ﬁnancial  services  market  that  is   
increasingly  preoccupied  with  safe  and 
secure  transactions  and  operations,  this 
issue  of  the  Journal  of  Risk  Intelligence   
focuses  on  risk-based  regulations  and 
best-practice  risk  management.  In  this 
unique  collection  of  thought-leader-
ship  articles,  our  authors  analyse  the   
advantages  to  ﬁnancial  institutions  of 
managing their risks well. The journal also 
identiﬁes pitfalls that institutions should avoid and approaches 
to reduce the cost of compliance.
Basel II is forcing many ﬁnancial institutions to improve their 
practices,  which  will  ultimately  provide  greater  access  to   
low-cost capital and improve corporate performance. More 
importantly, ﬁrms are starting to view risk management as an 
integral part of their business, not simply a matter of 
regulatory compliance.
Furthermore, in the wake of high-proﬁle business failures and 
tougher regulations, shareholders, creditors and customers are 
questioning senior executives about the integrity and quality of 
the data and analytical models used for managing a wide range 
of risks.
We hope you ﬁnd this journal to be informative and useful when 
developing your ﬁrm’s approach to these challenges. Above all, 
we hope that you enjoy this issue and ﬁnd in it both insight and 
meaning for your own work in risk management.
     
Peyman Mestchian 
Head of Risk Intelligence Practice
SAS EMEAJournal of Risk Intelligence
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Risk intelligence –
from compliance  
to performance
By Peyman Mestchian, SAS EMEA
“There are risks and costs 
to a program of action, but 
they are far less than the 
long-range risks and costs 
of comfortable inaction”.
– John F. Kennedy
Harsh regulatory and economic reali-
ties have led many ﬁnancial institutions 
to adopt new risk management systems 
in the hope that those systems will help 
companies extract greater insights from 
the data generated by their operational 
and transactional systems. Basel II, Sar-
banes-Oxley and new corporate gover-
nance and accounting standards have 
resulted in organisations embarking on 
multiple systems implementation and 
integration projects as part of an en-
terprisewide compliance programme. 
Too often the decision making has been 
“knee-jerk”, piecemeal and tactical. The 
reality is that most managers are un-
aware of the fact that risk management 
systems do not always have a positive 
impact on the overall risk performance 
of the ﬁrm. This is why, not surprisingly, 
they are often disappointed about the 
implementation results of risk manage-
ment programmes.
Unfortunately, research into risk man-
agement systems has tended to ignore 
many of the strategic implementation 
issues. The purpose of this article is to 
ﬁll part of this gap.
What is risk?
Risk is the chance of something hap-
pening that will have an impact upon 
objectives. It is measured in terms of 
consequences and likelihood. Within a 
business context, risk is the threat that 
an event or set of circumstances will 
adversely affect an organisation’s ability 
to achieve its business objectives.
Poor management of risk can have a 
negative impact on the achievement 
of business objectives and, ultimately, 
shareholder value. This can materialise 
in a number of ways:
1.Direct loss: trading loss, assets stolen 
(by clients, employees or the com-
petition), physical damage, litiga-
tion costs, human error resulting in 
irrecoverable asset or fund transfer, 
unexpected staff costs, regulatory 
penalties.
2.Indirect loss: brand erosion, loss of 
market share, key staff leakage, loss 
of key customers, increased insur-
ance costs.
3.Opportunity costs: lack of innova-
tive product development, forgone 
opportunities to enter new markets, 
missed opportunities to leverage the 
latest technologies and gain a com-
petitive edge.
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Enterprisewide risks
Internal risks External risks
People 
risks
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• Human error
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  safety
• Employment 
  law
• Training and 
  development
Process 
risks
• Financial   
  process and  
  control
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  relationship 
  management
• Project
  management
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Technology 
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• Data    
  security
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  integrity
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  performance
• Capacity
  planning
• Change
  management
Financial 
risks
• Credit risk
• Market risk
• Liquidity risk
Non-ﬁnancial 
risks
• Political risks
• Competitor 
  risks
• Socio- 
  economic    
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• External    
  fraud
Figure 1:  A taxonomy of business risksJournal of Risk Intelligence
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What is risk management?
Risk management is a subtle and 
often complex concept. A review of 
the literature shows that there are a 
variety of different theoretical and 
practical approaches to risk measure-
ment and management. Despite the 
variety of analyses and lack of stan-
dards, four key factors are central to 
most research on risk management. 
Specifically:
1.Risk management is a process.
2.Risk management belongs to     
everyone in the firm.
3.Risk management requires  
qualitative and quantitative data.
4.Risk management needs sponsor-
ship from the top.
At a more detailed level, risk man-
agement is about the effective use of 
resources through improved quan-
titative analysis, process efﬁciency, 
establishment of a sound system of 
internal controls (including remov-
ing redundant and ineffective con-
trols), the sharing of knowledge and 
good practice, leveraging of technol-
ogy to collect and analyse internal 
and external data, and prioritisation 
of effort. Like any other signiﬁcant 
business process, enterprisewide risk 
management needs to be supervised 
and reviewed.
Ultimately, risk management is the 
same as good business management.
Key challenges
While there is an industrywide con-
sensus that risk should be tackled 
in this way, organisations are faced 
with a multitude of practical chal-
lenges on how best to develop ef-
fective systems and functions for risk 
management.
Only a minority of ﬁrms are view-
ing the compliance challenge as a 
real business opportunity. It is an 
opportunity to improve systems and 
operations as well as create real sus-
tainable competitive advantage.
Businesses can gain competi-
tive advantage in many ways – for 
example, through strategy, systems 
and people – but these can be 
short-lived. Strategy can be copied, 
technology can be reproduced and 
people can be poached. But a ﬁrm’s 
data is unique and can be the source 
of competitive differentiation that 
cannot be copied.
Unfortunately, even after acquiring 
risk management systems, true com-
petitive differentiation often remains 
elusive. This is for four main reasons:
• Other firms are probably doing the 
same thing.
• The power of predictive analytics 
is not made available to those who 
need it, when they need it.
• Traditional risk management sys-
tems have been deployed tactically 
in silos that mirror the organisa-
tional systems.
• The technology architecture cannot 
support the risk strategy.
The demand for new tactical systems 
from the business shows no signs 
of slowing. The credit risk director 
demands best-in-class analytics and 
modelling functionality. The opera-
tional risk director wants a robust 
enterprisewide system for integrat-
ing quantitative and qualitative data. 
The CIO needs a fully scalable and 
ﬂexible architecture at minimum 
cost. The CRO (chief risk ofﬁcer) 
wants a consolidated ‘risk dash-
board’ to monitor and report on key 
risk indicators and exposures. The 
CFO needs a fully auditable and 
transparent reporting mechanism. 
The common theme among all of 
these new solutions is they are not 
operational, they are informational 
– not based on information from a 
single operational system, but from 
across the enterprise, wherever it 
may be found.
Company leaders must deliver these 
tactical systems that meet regulatory 
pressures, deliver answers quickly 
and mitigate business risk. And they 
need to do it all with a reduced 
budget. Meeting this dual challenge 
to develop an enterprise view of 
information while working with a 
reduced budget means ﬁrms need 
to balance short-term tactical goals 
against long-term strategic goals that 
are linked to performance targets.
People and culture issues around 
risk are signiﬁcant. By deﬁnition, 
risk is often caused by human-fac-
tor failures including human error, 
fraud and lack of knowledge. Simi-
larly, to truly address risk, risk man-
agement needs to be embedded into 
all business processes and activities. 
This task requires accountability, re-
sponsibility, rewards and empower-
ment for each individual within the 
organisation to identify, assess and 
treat the risks within their sphere of 
control. Ultimately, the best poli-
cies, procedures and systems in the 
world will not be sufﬁcient unless 
the people within the organisation 
understand why these tools are 
important and are motivated to use 
them – no one gets credit for ﬁxing 
a problem that never happened.
Figure 2: A summary of the risk management process.
Risk governance 
(Audit, supervisory review)
Setting policy  
and procedures 
Risk assessment  Risk control  Risk monitoring Journal of Risk Intelligence
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Link to performance
While performance (i.e. proﬁts and 
stock prices) is generally healthy 
in many segments of the ﬁnancial 
services market, delivering results 
is a lot more risky today than in the 
past. The key reason is complex-
ity (globalisation, new technology, 
competition and the current regula-
tory environment). Shareholder value 
is created when the reward exceeds 
the cost of risk: cost of capital is a 
generalised rate that reﬂects the riski-
ness of a given class of investment. 
If the reward (ROI) is higher than 
that rate, the investment is worth 
proportionately more. Risk intel-
ligence is an embedded and sys-
tematic approach to managing risk, 
which means that risk, risk factors, 
mitigation and capital management 
programs are considered in relation 
to business performance, internally 
and externally. Risk intelligence is 
about breaking the traditional silos 
of market, credit and operational risk 
– shareholders are indifferent to ar-
bitrary compartmentalisation of risk. 
Risk intelligence is proactive. Risk 
intelligence is about turning risk data 
to actionable knowledge.
Implementation strategies
• Firms should consider how and 
whether they embed risk manage-
ment systems in their business 
processes. It can be argued that 
risk management can only be 
successful when systems are stra-
tegically embedded. In certain 
situations firms should adopt a tac-
tical approach – to meet short-term 
goals. However, all firms should 
undertake a cost-benefit analysis 
to ensure that their tactical choices 
do not result in substantial costs 
and rework in the long term. This 
analysis could also affect the over-
all credibility of the risk manage-
ment initiative.
• Firms should move toward a single 
risk technology platform that builds 
on existing technology investments 
to deliver high-quality informa-
tion to every person who needs it, 
adding value at every step of the 
way and providing a single version 
of the truth. This single platform 
should provide breadth by inte-
grating functions and technologies 
from across the enterprise; depth 
by reaching all who need risk infor-
mation, in a way that is relevant 
to them; completeness by provid-
ing a comprehensive, end-to-end 
environment; advanced analytics 
for delivering predictive insight, not 
just hindsight; data quality by giv-
ing all applications one validated, 
verified version of the facts; and 
intelligence storage by meeting the 
informational needs of risk intel-
ligence applications.
• Top management support is essen-
tial for strategic implementation 
of risk management systems. Such 
support not only helps to trans-
form the organisation and culture 
but also ensures the continuation 
of risk management projects that 
experience setbacks.
• Finally, firms often consider risk 
management software the key 
to success in risk management 
implementation. Although a 
substantial part of the risk and 
governance budget will need to 
be allocated to software, decision 
makers should improve the over-
all risk management process and 
apply the software to enable and 
automate that process.
Conclusion
There is currently a lot of regulatory 
focus on risk management and cor-
porate governance. This has brought 
the subject higher up the corporate 
agenda and has initiated substantial 
compliance-driven projects across 
all industries. However, regulatory 
compliance is not the best reason 
for enhancing risk management 
systems and processes. A purely 
regulatory view will, in general, 
lead ﬁrms to implement the least 
amount of risk management re-
quired for compliance. As a result, 
these companies are not realising 
the full business beneﬁts of effec-
tive risk management. Thinking 
beyond compliance and focusing 
on the signiﬁcant and unquestion-
able returns that can be derived 
from effective risk management will 
move this discipline into the next 
phase of development and embed it 
as part of every company’s complete 
value-chain.
 Journal of Risk Intelligence
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Theory and practice  
in risk-based capital  
assessment methodology
By Jimmy Skoglund (SAS Sweden) 
and Kaj Nyström (Umea University)
Introduction and overview
Banks are currently struggling with 
their Basel II implementations 
– addressing the Pillar 1 mini-
mum capital requirements and 
any changes to existing economic 
capital models to comply with the 
Pillar 2 requirements on the in-
ternal capital assessment process. 
Among banks there is widespread 
support for migration to a regula-
tory environment with risk-based 
capital assessment. There is also 
awareness that this change poses 
several challenges well beyond 
the implementation of a credit risk 
rating system. In particular, the 
introduction of Basel II reconciles 
regulatory capital with risk man-
agement practice in focusing on 
the planning for and managing of 
tomorrow’s risks. Though the Basel 
II guidance in this planning pro-
cess is not so clear, regula-
tors and banks agree that 
volatile movements in the 
level of capital held arising 
from changes in economic 
conditions is undesirable. 
The methodology devel-
oped at banks to address 
Pillar 2 risk-based capital 
assessment is, therefore, 
based on a long-term risk 
assessment, e.g., covering a 
complete business cycle. 
It may seem that the hori-
zon of the risk assessment 
can be dictated by the exis-
tence or non-existence of a 
liquid hedge or secondary 
market. But banks gener-
ally, in case of existence, 
want to avoid speculations 
about their ability to func-
tion in adverse economic 
scenarios. Such speculation 
would also be unaccept-
able from the perspective of inves-
tors since, in that case, they would 
be the lenders of last resort in a 
situation they may have expected 
the bank to be protected against. 
From a methodological perspec-
tive, the challenge in risk-based 
capital assessment is, therefore, to 
measure risk accurately through 
time. If capital is to provide the re-
quired cushion over the swings of 
a business cycle, then the evolu-
tion of risk through time becomes 
most important.
Figure 1 displays an overview of 
the three pillars in the new Basel 
II Capital Accord. Pillar 1 address 
minimum capital requirements for 
credit risk, market risk and opera-
tional risk. Pillar 2 addresses the 
need for a comprehensive view of 
risk capital, i.e. the bank’s internal 
capital assessment process. Pillar 
3 addresses the demands on mar-
ket discipline and communication 
towards investors, rating agencies 
and others.
Jimmy Skoglund 
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ing risk method-
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for economic capital methodology 
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lished in Journal of Risk, Journal  
of Banking and Finance and  
Risk Books.
Kaj Nyström is currently an as-
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tant in the ﬁnancial industry. As a 
researcher he is well established 
in the areas of harmonic analysis 
and partial differential equations 
and has published extensively in 
established mathematical journals. 
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years for Swedbank within their 
project for economic capital, and 
he has published several papers 
on risk in Journal of Risk, Journal 
of Banking and Finance and Risk 
Books. Kaj holds a Ph.D. in pure 
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positions at the University of Chi-
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Credit 
risk
• Standardized
  approach
• Internal
  ratings-based
  foundation
• Internal
  ratings-based
  advanced
Market
risk
• Standardized
  approach
• Internal
  model
Operational 
risk
• Standardized
  approach
• Basic indicator 
  approach
• Advanced 
  measurement 
  approach
Pillar 1: Minimum capital requirements
Pillar 2: Comprehensive  
view of risk capital needed
• Framework 
  and principles
• Minimum 
  standards
• Individual 
demands
Pillar 3: Market discipline
• Information
  policy
• Information
  demands
  transparent
  accounting
Figure 1: An overview of the three Pillars 
in the Basel II Capital AccordJournal of Risk Intelligence
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The conceptual view that actual 
capital is based on a long-term risk 
assessment also has implications 
for how capital is implemented 
in business control, e.g. credit 
granting and risk-adjusted pricing. 
Allocated capital, as well as provi-
sions, are based on a long-term 
risk assessment, regardless of the 
actual level of capital allocation 
(such as exposure level through 
internal transfer prices or business 
unit level). If pricing were depen-
dent on the economic cycle, it 
would be counter to the interests 
of both banks and debtors, since 
generally it is the banks and not 
the debtors who are best posi-
tioned to hold capital buffers. 
Figure 2 displays an overview of a 
bank’s capital assessment process. 
Firstly, the ability to address the 
full impact of Pillar 2 resides in 
the bank’s ability to integrate risks. 
This requires, among other things, a 
methodology for risk integration and 
consolidation of risk IT infrastruc-
ture. Secondly, actual capital is not 
assessed over one year but rather 
over a complete business cycle. 
Thirdly, capital needs to be incor-
porated in business control, both in 
terms of front-end credit granting 
and risk-adjusted pricing, and in 
terms of back-end strategic capital 
management, e.g. through securiti-
sation structuring.
The level of capital in place should 
be able to cover losses arising as a 
result of economic scenarios pos-
sible during a business cycle. Banks 
are, therefore, addressing the need 
to deﬁne what they consider to be 
the key economic factors that drive 
their regulatory minimum capital 
requirements, loss rates and balance 
sheets. Speciﬁcally, they are focus-
ing on developing a methodology 
and capturing data for these key 
risk drivers to factor their impact 
explicitly. How well banks achieve 
this will, for obvious reasons, be a 
core success factor in the disclosure 
requirements of Pillar 3. It will also 
affect how well they are able to 
integrate capital into strategic ﬁnan-
cial planning at the board level.
The push to deﬁne key risk drivers 
means that one of the goals of the 
risk methodologies they develop 
for Pillar 2 and 3 compliance is to 
make risk comprehensible, both 
in terms of inputs and projected 
impacts, Here, inputs would refer to 
economic scenarios and projected 
impacts would include changes in 
regulatory minimum capital require-
ments, loss rates and the bank’s 
result and balance sheet.
In this process the explicit choice 
of scenarios is the key input to 
the analysis. And this is the most 
difﬁcult point, both from a method-
ological as well as a communicative 
perspective. From the methodologi-
cal perspective the question is to 
understand and capture the correct 
“transfer function” describing the 
impact of speciﬁc scenarios. From 
the perspective of communication 
it is important to be able to com-
municate how the scenarios are 
constructed. This communication 
is crucial if the people within the 
organisation are to understand the 
scenario and feel comfortable with 
its construction.
Figure 3 displays the components of 
sound risk methodology that could 
form the basis for risk integration and 
communication. One requirement of 
a risk methodology is that it should 
allow for the integration of expert 
views at the scenario level and that 
it should enable communication of 
scenarios as well as their effects.
Figure 2: An overview of the capital assessment process under the Basel II Accord.
Figure 3: Risk methodology as the basis for risk integration and communication.
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Capital assessment 
methodology for credit risk
For credit risk, the ﬁrst step toward 
the explicit quantiﬁcation of the im-
pact of key risk drivers is the observa-
tion that changes in minimum capital 
requirements and loss rates over time 
are expected to be pro-cyclical. This 
is due to rating migrations (of borrow-
ers and guarantors) and to changes in 
the value of exposures and collateral.
Figure 4 displays the components 
at risk in the Basel II IRB minimum 
capital requirements for credit risk – 
exposures at default (EAD), exposure 
risk weights (RW) due to rating migra-
tions and loss given default (LGD) 
due to the risk in collateral values. In 
approaches to economic capital as-
sociated with credit risk, the business 
risk in future margin income due to 
competitive pressures must be prop-
erly addressed. If a tightening of the 
excess margin income earned by the 
bank occurs in the future, this would 
have a direct impact on future results 
and would have an indirect impact 
through the required adjustment of 
the level of economic capital. 
Starting with migration risk and the 
associated rating methodology, we 
describe below and exemplify the 
methodological risk measurement 
process for the components that ad-
dress portfolio credit risk.
It is well known that the statisti-
cal power of a scorecard or rating 
decays rapidly with the prediction 
horizon of the assessment. This 
means that the preferred approach 
is a combination of short-term as-
sessments (based on one year, for 
example) and a methodology for 
explaining the long-run system-
atic rating migrations based on key 
economic factors, such as unem-
ployment rates, output gaps, stock 
indices and other ﬁnancial indices. 
The methodology to assign a rating 
based on the average risk of default 
over the entire period to maturity is 
then based on the current risk grade 
and the sensitivity of the exposure 
to the economic cycle, which is 
derived from the methodology for 
explaining long-run systematic rating 
migrations. In this we may assign a 
loan with a low one-year scorecard 
or rating PD to a relatively high-risk 
grade, as we assess the fact that the 
longer-term viability of the borrower 
may be questionable based on its 
sensitivity to the business cycle.
The above two-step approach to 
rating methodology has several ad-
vantages. For example, it allows for 
back-testing of the rating systems of 
individual banks and for a compari-
son of ratings across banks. More-
over, diversiﬁcation and concentra-
tion effects can be captured through 
the business cycle, since these 
effects are not subsumed in the rat-
ing itself but rather captured in the 
methodology for explaining long-run 
systematic migrations. One of the 
difﬁculties with a rating methodol-
ogy that attempts to assign a rating 
directly according to a ‘through the 
cycle’ methodology is that it signiﬁ-
cantly complicates the tasks of back 
testing. In particular, that the average 
observed default frequencies for a 
given grade do not equal the as-
sociated one-year PD for the grade 
may not point to a ﬂaw in the rating 
system or its application. 
In general though, the effect of pro-
cyclicality does exist regardless of the 
internal rating philosophy applied by 
the bank. Speciﬁcally, the observed 
pro-cyclicality in the empirical migra-
tion matrices used by the rating 
agencies shows that attempting a 
direct rating “through the cycle” is 
not an easy task. (See, for example, 
the empirical case studies on pro-cy-
clicality in Carling et al. (2001) and 
Segoviano and Lowe (2002).)
Using either rating approach, the 
pro-cyclicality of capital requires 
banks to develop methodologies to 
understand how rating migration 
effects capital. This involves deﬁning 
and explicitly linking key economic 
factors capturing default and rating 
migration volatility.
Figure 5 displays the different rat-
ing migration risks experienced in 
practice and their applicability to 
the different segments, i.e. retail, 
Small and Medium sized Entities 
(SME) and large corporates. Sys-
tematic risk is a concern for all 
the segments and is also used to 
capture correlation between the 
rating migration of customers. For 
the retail segment the systematic 
factors include unemployment rates, 
interest rates and GDP growth. For 
the SME segment different industry-
speciﬁc performance indices may 
be used, such as leading indicators. 
For large corporates the systematic 
Figure 4: Components at risk in Basel II IRB minimum capital requirements.
EAD RW exposure Potential 
exposure
RW guarantee
Financial
collateral
Physical 
collateral
Add-on CCF
Haircuts
Mitigation 
risk
Collateral 
value riskJournal of Risk Intelligence
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component in stock prices, such 
as a stock index, may be used as 
a systematic variable. However, 
in practice the actual linking of a 
systematic variable to a segment 
may be non-trivial due to a limited 
rating history of only a few years. 
If this is the case, the bank would 
have to adopt a combination of 
expertise, judgment and available 
data. As time progress and more 
data are captured a re-evaluation 
of the expertise judgment may be 
necessary.
Large corporates also need to 
capture idiosyncratic risk. And 
this might also be important for 
SMEs, depending on the size of the 
portfolio. The traditional approach 
is to split the systematic credit 
risk component into diversiﬁable 
idiosyncratic components akin to 
a traditional capital asset pricing 
model. Examples include several 
applications of the well-known 
Merton model.
Finally, the modelling of so-called 
domino effects or default conta-
gions is at the heart of sound credit 
risk methodology. The idea is to 
capture direct default dependence 
links between ﬁrms – something 
that has been the occupation of 
traditional credit analysts for a 
long time. However, the formalisa-
tion of this concept in a credit risk 
methodology requires the actual 
modelling of this dependence. This 
involves expert judgments of, for 
example, the effect of the health 
of ﬁrm A on the health of ﬁrm B. 
Moreover, will changes to the health 
of either or both ﬁrms affect our 
SME portfolio and/or retail portfolio?
However, it is not sufﬁcient to 
capture rating migration volatil-
ity and dependence. Loss Given 
Default and Exposure At Default 
may also display signiﬁcant depen-
dence on the economic cycle. In 
particular, the accurate measure-
ment of LGD requires the validation 
of the process(es) for the valuation 
of collateral currently employed. 
It is equally important to capture 
the volatility in LGD, as well as 
its correlation with rating migra-
tion. This can be achieved by the 
mapping of collaterals to a set of 
collateral evolution models based 
on, for example, historical property 
and ﬁnancial indices. (The historical 
indices being the base for capturing 
speciﬁc collateral volatility as well 
as, indirectly, the correlation with 
rating migration, through their cor-
relation with systematic factors.)
Figure 6 illustrates the process of 
mapping collateral to a set of col-
lateral evolution models based on 
indices.
This LGD measurement process 
must resolve the fact that the Basel 
deﬁnition of default does not coin-
cide with the events or the timing of 
an actual ﬁrm bankruptcy, legal re-
structuring or customer settlement, 
i.e. the events that yield the ultimate 
losses. Indeed, as many banks do 
not sell their troubled assets there is 
a time dimension of default which 
needs to be explicitly accounted 
for through the measurement of the 
transitions between default states. 
For example, in the Basel deﬁnition 
of default high loan-to-value mort-
gages may be more likely to end up 
as forced sales of collateral than low 
loan-to-value mortgages. Of course, 
such information resides in the 
workout process of the bank. 
Figure 5: The different rating migration risks and their applicability to different segments.
Figure 6: The process of mapping collateral to collateral evolution models 
based on indices.
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Figure 7 displays a potential default 
event chain deﬁned by a bank. In 
this chain the Basel deﬁnition of 
default of 90 days due is a “techni-
cal” deﬁnition of default that does 
not necessarily coincide with the 
event of bankruptcy or customer 
settlement. Indeed, typically only a 
fraction of the exposures that are in 
Basel default end up in the state of 
settlement. Moreover, only a subset 
of those exposures that actually end 
up in settlement may be realised 
defaults in the strict sense. LGD 
can hence be measured on multiple 
levels in this process with LGD con-
ditional on settlement being greater 
than or equal to LGD conditional on 
Basel default. In this regard, see also 
Peura and Soininen (2005) on the 
use of the Basel II minimum capital 
requirement formulas in the event of 
multitier LGD, as well as the con-
nection between multitier LGD and 
credit risk impairment allowances 
under IAS 39.
Logically, portfolio segmentation is 
the ﬁrst step in any application of the 
credit risk methodology introduced. 
Figure 8 displays a segmentation of 
the credit portfolio as may be used by 
a bank, as well as the steps needed 
to capture and explicitly factor the 
impact of key risk drivers of rating 
migrations and collateral values. In 
practice the portfolio segmentation 
is also the basis for capital allocation 
granularity in internal transfer prices.
To apply the methodology intro-
duced as well as exemplify the 
degree of pro-cyclicality in Basel II 
IRB-A capital that can be expected, 
ﬁgure 9 displays the upper limit on 
relative Basel II IRB-A capital, at 
the 99% conﬁdence level, over a 
planning horizon of 10 years for a 
large retail and SME portfolio col-
lateralised with property. The results 
obtained are based on a simulation-
based approach to scenario analysis 
and stress testing that models ex-
plicitly the rating migration volatility 
based on systematic factors, and in 
the event of actual loss, the value 
of collateral. In ﬁgure 9 rating grade 
1 indicates the exposures with the 
lowest initial PD (on average 0.01%) 
and rating grade 8 indicates the 
exposures with the highest initial PD 
(on average 21%). It is evident from 
ﬁgure 9 that the portfolio is domi-
nated by exposures in ‘good’ rating 
classes and is therefore exposed 
to the risk of signiﬁcantly higher 
minimum capital requirements in 
the future. 
Figure 10 displays the lower limit on 
relative net cash ﬂows, being the ba-
sis for credit risk economic capital, 
at the 99% conﬁdence level, over a 
planning horizon of 10 years for the 
same large loan portfolio as in the 
case of the Basel II capital displayed 
in ﬁgure 9. This uses the models 
for systematic rating migration and 
collateral value used in the Basel 
II case and a model for the excess 
margin, at customer reset times. In 
our case a slight tightening over time 
of the excess margin is implemented 
(this tightening is due to increas-
ing external competitive pressures). 
As can be seen from ﬁgure10, the 
effect that “good” grades are more 
risky and hence require, on a rela-
tive basis, more capital is true for 
economic capital as well, although 
to a lesser extent than for Basel II 
minimum capital requirements. The 
reason for this is that Basel II capital 
– as opposed to economic capital 
– is based on loss rates and on suc-
cessive quality depreciation through 
rating migrations. For marked-to-
market credit risk, however, the two 
would be equal in this regard.
Figure 7: Potential default event chain.
Figure 8: An example of 
portfolio segmentation.
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Figure 11 displays an evolution of 
credit risk methodologies to sum-
marise our discussion. Steps 1, 2 
and 3 in this evolution represent the 
implementation of credit risk rating 
systems, risk-adjusted pricing based on 
the current rating, and regulatory risk-
weighted assets. Today most banks are 
at stage 3, and at this stage stress tests 
are deﬁned strictly in terms of changes 
in PD and LGD, with no reference to 
underlying economic key-risk drivers. 
The next stage in this evolution is to 
consolidate the drivers of migration 
risk and the risk in collateral values 
and to assess the diversiﬁcation and 
concentration effects. Finally, this will 
have an impact on how banks view 
their actual current capitalisation and 
their risk-adjusted pricing as well as 
the way they strategically manage their 
loan book.
For further details on the methodology 
for portfolio credit risk presented here 
we refer to e.g., Wilson (1997) and 
in particular Nyström and Skoglund 
(2005).
Capital assessment 
methodology for ALM risk
The spread income between the assets 
a bank invests in (loans and securities) 
and the cost of its funds (deposits and 
other sources) should allow it to meet 
its operating expenses and earn a fair 
proﬁt on its capital. In order to gener-
ate the spread income a bank takes on 
and faces several risks, in particular 
credit risk, interest rate (or funding) risk 
and liquidity risk. Often the funding 
base consists of deposits, outstand-
ing short-term and long-term debt in 
the form of emitted instruments, and 
traditional deposit accounts, such as 
demand deposits, savings accounts 
and market time deposits. 
Consistent with the demands of Pillar 
2, banks do not only have to address 
key economic drivers for credit risk, 
but such drivers also have to be ad-
dressed for asset and liability man-
agement (ALM) and operational 
risk. Actual risk consolidation, 
Figure 9: Upper limit on relative Basel II IRB-A capital, at the 99% conﬁdence level, over 
a planning horizon of 10 years for a large loan portfolio collateralised with property.
Figure 10: Lower limit on relative net cash ﬂows, at the 99% conﬁdence level, over a 
planning horizon of 10 years for a large loan portfolio collateralised with property.
Figure 11: Evolution of credit risk methodology.
M
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
 
a
d
v
a
n
c
e
s
Time
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
4
3
5
6
Graded loans
We need to price for risk
RWA compliance and 
simple stress tests
Consolidation and 
macroeconomic 
stress tests
Through-the-cycle 
capital planning 
and pricing
Through-the-cycle 
diversiﬁcation is  
paramount – strategic 
loan book managementJournal of Risk Intelligence
PAGE 12
i.e. integration of the different risk 
types, then occurs at the level of key 
economic factors. The capturing of 
correlation effects for key economic 
factors, both within and between 
risk types, is of paramount impor-
tance if diversiﬁcation and concen-
tration effects are to be explicitly 
accounted for in scenario analysis 
and stress testing. 
In traditional ALM analysis the bank 
is seen to consist of two legs, the 
funding leg and the loan or cus-
tomer leg, and in most banks credit 
risk and ALM risks are separated at a 
clearing centre. One of the reasons 
that this centre exists is to allow 
performance measurement of loan 
originators to be based solely on re-
turn on credit risk, basically because 
loan originators typically have no 
inﬂuence on the actual funding. The 
short-term ALM risks in differences 
in cash ﬂows in the funding and 
customer legs, and in particular the 
differences in timing of these ﬂows, 
reside at Treasury, where the daily 
ALM management is executed with 
transactions on the funding leg. 
Figure 12 displays a situation where 
the ALM risk inherent in a customer 
exposure of 100 units of money is 
cleared at a clearing centre. The interest 
rate for the customer exposure is ﬁxed 
for ﬁve years. On the funding side of this 
exposure is a ﬁnancing of 100 units of 
money through, for instance, an emitted 
bond with one-year intervals between 
reset times (or maturity). The customer 
interest rate is 5% and the funding rate 
is 3%. The actual margin is therefore 
2%. If the funding had been perfectly 
matched with the cash ﬂow offered to 
the customer, in which case the ALM 
risk vanishes, the funding rate would 
be 4% with an actual margin of 1%. To 
achieve the higher margin, i.e. 2%, the 
bank therefore has to take on an interest 
rate risk, which is managed at Treasury. 
The 1% margin is the margin that would 
be used in loan performance measure-
ment on the level of loan originators. 
Figure 13 displays the incremental 
expected economic proﬁt, in percent, 
for the same loan portfolio as in ﬁgures 
9 and 10. In ﬁgure 13 we have used a 
deﬁnition of actual capital as the maxi-
mum (over time) Basel II IRB-A capital 
in ﬁgure 9. The expected incremental 
proﬁt is deﬁned in two steps. In the 
ﬁrst step we deﬁne a cost of risk as the 
incremental expected loss plus capital 
times the cost of capital – the cost of 
capital being set here to 10%. In the 
second step the incremental expected 
economic proﬁt is deﬁned as the margin 
with credit risk, i.e. the margin, as in 
ﬁgure 12, which contains no ALM risk 
and which is used for loan performance 
measurements, minus the cost of risk. 
In ﬁgure 13 the incremental expected 
Figure 12: Traditional ALM risk clearing and management.
Figure 13: Incremental expected economic proﬁt based on maximum 
Basel II IRB-A capital with an assumed cost of capital of 10%.
Maturity/time to repricing 
(years)
Financing 
curve (%)
3%
4%
1 5
+
-
5%
4% 3%
+100
-100 -100
Margin with 
ALM risk
Margin with 
credit risk }
used in
loan performance 
measurement
Cashﬂow 
structure
Interest rate risk P&L
Background color key
Clearing center
Treasury ALM riskJournal of Risk Intelligence
PAGE 13
economic proﬁt for the total port-
folio is decreasing over time due to 
assumptions of tightening of excess 
margins and of decreasing volumes. 
Note that the increase over time in 
the incremental expected economic 
proﬁt for the rating grade(s) with the 
highest initial PD cannot neutralise the 
decrease in the overall proﬁtability of 
the portfolio. 
A separation of credit and ALM risks, 
as described above, may seem to 
contradict demands to integrate the 
two risks, but this is not the case. The 
separation enables consistency in 
performance measurement in loan 
origination as exempliﬁed in ﬁgure 
13. However, from a treasury perspec-
tive credit risk cannot really be sepa-
rated from other ALM risks – it is, by 
necessity, an integrated part of ALM. 
Where volumes, reset times, maturi-
ties and ﬁnancing rates are determin-
istic on both the funding and the loan 
side, this integration is not difﬁcult 
per se. But in reality an assumption of 
determinism is an oversimpliﬁcation.
Figure 14 displays the generic loan 
structure deﬁning the cash ﬂows on 
the customer leg. A loan consists of a 
time to maturity, an amortisation struc-
ture, an exposure and an interest rate. 
The time to maturity can be determin-
istic as well as non-deterministic, the 
latter is the case when, for instance, 
prepayments are allowed. The interest 
rate can be ﬁxed as well as variable. 
In the actual construction of a loan the 
loan structure is parameterised, i.e. all 
degrees of freedom are ﬁxed and, as a 
result, the loan generates a determinis-
tic or non-deterministic cash ﬂow.
Focusing on the funding leg, ﬁgure 15 
shows the generic ﬂow of funds into 
customer deposits. At the top there is 
an inﬂow which can be assumed to 
equal the income level of the cus-
tomer. The ﬂow is divided into three 
sub ﬂows, the transaction volume, the 
saving volume and other investments. 
The transaction volume is allocated 
to a transaction account and is used 
to fulﬁl the short time liquidity needs 
of the customer. The saving volume is 
allocated, based on a saving policy of 
the customer, between the different 
saving accounts offered by the bank. 
The differences between the accounts 
are deﬁned through differences in the 
conditions offered and in particular 
through differences in the return per 
unit time and unit currency paid on 
the deposit. Parts of the inﬂow can also 
be assumed to be allocated to other 
investments, such as mutual funds. 
We refer to the choices or strategies 
applied by the customer over time 
and resulting in the evolution and 
allocation of funds as an investment 
policy. To parameterise an investment 
policy we need to know the current 
allocation and the current strategy for 
the allocation of the inﬂow. The latter 
strategy is non-trivial to parameterise. 
In practice, therefore, the factor that 
makes the problem of the valuation 
and risk management of the potential 
mismatch between the funding and 
customer legs complex is what can be 
referred to as optionality. Generally, 
banking books contain numerous im-
plicit options, such as early withdrawal 
options, options to transfer from less to 
more proﬁtable accounts, prepayment 
options on mortgages, borrowing op-
tions etc. In the structure for the fund-
ing and customer leg described above 
the customer has the option to switch, 
at the reset times, between loan struc-
tures and, in particular, at basically any 
time, change the policy applied for 
investments in the demand deposits. 
The result of the latter may be that the 
customer closes all of its accounts and 
withdraws the amounts deposited or 
that it transfers all cash available to the 
most proﬁtable account offered by the 
bank. In both cases, this results in a 
Figure 14: Generic loan structure deﬁning the cash ﬂows on the customer leg.
Figure 15: Investment policies deﬁne the evolution and allocation of funds into 
customer deposits.
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higher funding rate for the bank. As any 
of these options are, to some extent, 
exercised in response to interest rate 
changes (i.e. market or administered 
rates), they induce non-linear interest 
rate risk. A bank that neglects to ac-
count for this optionality may end up 
overvaluing its assets and, potentially, 
mispricing its products.
Risk managers need a number of 
behavioural models if they are to 
perform dynamic analyses of future 
cash ﬂows, estimate the likely path of 
future net interest income in line with 
various ﬁnancial scenarios, including 
stress scenarios, and hedge interest rate 
risk. In particular banks need to model 
the choices made by the customer 
– we emphasise that optionality enters 
through choices of loan structure and 
investment policy and through changes 
in choices of loan structure and invest-
ment policies over time. 
Because customers may make transi-
tions between different loan structures 
and different investment policies, be-
havioural features need to be addressed 
in a dynamic and integrated model for 
ALM. Furthermore, the establishment 
of a sound pricing mechanism requires 
reliable behavioural models that spread 
economic-value-added commercial 
incentives across all business units. 
Indeed, such models are, properly 
designed, also of considerable assis-
tance to the marketing department in 
the development and pricing of new 
products and offerings.
To create and calibrate the type of be-
havioural models referred to above we 
can assess these problems on a basis 
similar to that used to assess credit 
risk in, for example, retail portfolios. 
Firstly, the set of key risk factors must 
be identiﬁed. In our case these factors 
include interest rates (market rates, loan 
rates, deposit rates) that trigger the ac-
tion of the customers to, for example, 
prepay or renegotiate their mortgage 
or to reconsider the amount deposited 
as well as its allocation. Secondly, in 
order to create a dynamic and inte-
grated model for ALM and credit risk 
the portfolio credit risk model has to 
be complemented with additional 
dimensions and models in the portfolio 
segmentation in ﬁgure 8. In particular, 
on the asset side there is a need for a 
reﬁned segmentation of the customer 
base, focusing on a classiﬁcation of 
loan structure as in ﬁgure 14, and a 
model for loan structure transition be-
haviour. Similarly, ﬁgure 15 is the basis 
for segmentation of the funding leg 
together with models and key drivers 
for investment policy behaviour.
Capital assessment 
methodology for  
operational risk
Within banks there is pressure to man-
age and quantify operational risk in 
a formalised and structured way. This 
pressure mainly comes from regulators. 
But it also comes through a recognition 
that the increasing sophistication of 
ﬁnancial products and systems. sug-
gests that operational risk need not be a 
minor concern. Furthermore, banks are 
recognising that expected losses due to 
operational risk should be priced into 
their products. For example, the ex-
pected loss of credit card fraud should 
affect the pricing of credit cards.
At a basic measurement level this struc-
turing of operational risk requires three 
sources of loss or potential loss infor-
mation. In particular, there is a need for 
an internal loss database representing 
actual loss events, self-assessment and 
scenario analysis representing expert 
opinions on loss events that could 
potentially be experienced, and an 
external loss database collecting actual 
external loss events. 
These basic measurement tools are 
required components if a bank is to 
qualify for Advanced Measurement 
Approaches (AMA) to operational risk. 
They also serve as a base for calibra-
tion, i.e. they are all, in combination, 
the information source for calibrating 
operational risk models. Speciﬁcally, 
their main use is for the calibration of 
the frequency and severity of identiﬁed 
operational risks. For a discussion of 
different models for the frequency and 
severity density used in operational 
risk see Ebnöther et al. (2001) and for a 
discussion of the issues that arise when 
pooling an internal and external data-
base, which both are truncated from 
below, see Frachot et al. (2002).
However, the actual risk identiﬁcation 
process is not driven solely by the risk 
information acquired from the three 
measurement tools. The process of self-
assessment also plays a part. One goal 
of the latter is to give a description of 
the internal ﬂow of processes, e.g. the 
process of producing a product such 
as a loan. The objective of the process 
self-assessment as part of the risk iden-
tiﬁcation process is threefold. Firstly, 
it serves as the basis for the allocation 
of operational risk capital, i.e. both 
unexpected and expected loss on the 
desired granularity level, such as busi-
ness line, product line, etc. Secondly, a 
huge problem with the quantiﬁcation 
of operational risks is the lack of actual 
data. Hence, a structured approach 
to risk identiﬁcation based on process 
self-assessment and not simply loss 
data is required. The basic idea is that 
qualitatively structuring and document-
ing a bank’s process would identify 
actual risks that would not have been 
recognised otherwise. Thirdly, a natural 
element of process self-assessment is 
the identiﬁcation of dependencies in 
the process ﬂow.
Having addressed risk identiﬁcation, 
an important part of operational risk 
quantiﬁcation involves identifying and 
assessing, by data or expertise, the im-
pact of so-called key risk indicators on 
the frequency and severity of loss. Such 
indicators include business volume and 
employment turnover.
Figure 17 displays the elements of the 
risk identiﬁcation and measurement 
process and their use in the calibration 
of operational risk models.
The identiﬁcation of key risk indicators 
(KRI) is also of utmost importance from 
the active operational risk manage-
ment perspective. The goal is to identify 
exposures towards KRI, by which the Journal of Risk Intelligence
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bank can actually steer the inten-
sity and severity of loss. Of course, 
it may not be the KRI itself that the 
operational risk manager has control 
over. Instead, the control instrument 
available may be via the parameters 
linking the key risk drivers to the in-
tensity and/or the shape of the severity 
loss density. These numerical control 
variates are therefore natural ways to 
manage and numerically measure 
“quality adjustment”. In addition, the 
risk manager may also exercise control 
by the use of insurance programs in 
a similar way that the credit manager 
uses credit derivatives for insurance. 
In practice this means that the level of 
operational risk at the banks can, to 
some degree, be controlled through 
internal risk management activities. 
However, the application of a control 
is usually associated with a cost so that 
the decision to implement a control is 
based on a cost-beneﬁt analysis. As the 
operational risk management unit will 
rarely have a budget for implementa-
tion of controls, such cost-beneﬁt 
decisions are decentralised to the busi-
ness units or product lines. The level 
of operational risk capital allocated to 
the business unit or product line then 
serves as an incentive for continuous 
control evaluation. 
 
Figure 18 displays the components of 
an operational risk framework. This 
involves a structured approach to risk 
identiﬁcation via process self-assess-
Figure 17: Elements of the risk identiﬁcation and measurement process and 
their use in the calibration of operational risk models.
Figure 18: Components in the operational risk framework.
ment and risk measurement, as well 
as methods for risk aggregation and 
capital allocation. An important part of 
the operational risk management frame-
work is the method for validation. On 
a business process level the operational 
risk management unit must be able 
to measure quality in the (process) 
self-assessment. One way of doing this 
is through objective data as illustrated 
below. At the bank and business unit 
level, validation is based on external 
data and other benchmarks.
For further details on operational risk 
methodology we refer readers to Cruz 
(2004) and, for a mathematical AMA 
framework, to Nyström and Skoglund 
(2004).
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Basel II credit risk 
management – the 
devil is in the data
By Casey Campbell, SAS UK
Installing a group-level credit risk 
management system poses techni-
cal, functional and cost challenges. 
Data management goes well beyond 
connecting a risk system to corre-
sponding data warehouses and tends 
to represent up to 80% of the total 
implementation effort. This brief ar-
ticle seeks to highlight issues which 
may be material for ﬁrms’ costs and 
for avoiding implementation pitfalls.
Data 
The main impediment to implement-
ing a credit risk information platform 
is usually data availability. Assuming 
data is already in place, three topics 
tend to dominate:
• Access.
• Quality.
• Process management.
The main challenge with all three 
topics is to deliver results in the 
shortest possible period without in-
curring massive ﬁnancial overheads.
Accessing data 
Credit risk measurement involves data, 
often in large volumes and dispersed 
across various platforms and geogra-
phies. These disparate systems may 
consist of several databases and data-
base management platforms. Secur-
ing efﬁcient access to each platform’s 
underlying data is critical to a credit 
risk system’s cost effectiveness. 
To be efficient, data access tools need 
to provide secure read, write and 
update functionality with minimal 
requirement for human intervention. 
Data access should also cover mul-
tiple formats including:
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• Data stored in relational databases.
• Enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
systems.
• Non-relational data stores such as 
mainframe formats.
• PC file formats such as Excel and 
MS Access.
 Access processes should also be 
ﬂexible enough to accommodate, 
as best as possible, any data stor-
age technology developments and 
potential acquisitions. 
Furthermore the data management 
process should avoid any disruption 
to the systems accessed and seek to:
• Ensure timely data access with pre-
configured routines – these need 
to function across multiple data 
sources and platforms.
• Provide data security – this needs 
to honour and augment the native 
security of the target data source.
• Improve processing performance 
and reduce network traffic by limit-
ing access processes (e.g. database 
queries, joins and some functions) 
to what is necessary and to specifi-
cally target data sources and pro-
cessing points.
The above may be achieved by 
converting data into a generalised 
resource which is available to all 
potential processing systems, regard-
less of whether they are proprietary 
or a third party’s. Such a data con-
version process should also incorpo-
rate an ability to write the converted 
data back to a targeted data source 
if needed. Ideally standards-based 
computing and application program-
ming interfaces (APIs) are employed 
for this. Journal of Risk Intelligence
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Data quality
Data from different parts of the same 
organisation can vary in quality.
1 Risk 
systems rely on high quality data, so 
quality issues need to be addressed 
up front.
2 Group-level systems should 
be able to both accept varying data 
quality levels and correct for any 
shortfalls. Consequently, they should 
be capable of:
• Fixing missing or mistaken data.
• Identifying ways of improving data 
collection. 
• Reducing data redundancies. 
This last capability will be particularly 
useful for streamlining data transmit-
ted between organisational layers. 
The data quality management system 
should also be capable of integrating 
and monitoring data quality across 
multiple systems to provide a “consis-
tent version of the truth”.
Process management for data
Rapidly increasing analytical sophis-
tication and corresponding data 
requirements are pushing up  
demand for data volume manage-
ment and data integration. This  
administrative requirement, in turn, 
is driving up the cost of data prepa-
ration. To control such costs, re-us-
able, fully documented, auditable 
and schedulable data processes are 
critical. These should replace the 
previously tedious, time consuming 
and expensive processes that have 
tied up both information systems 
and risk management resources. 
Furthermore, as data processing 
responsibilities become more dis-
persed, a multiuser approach with 
check-in/check-out capabilities, 
prototyping and schedule automa-
tion is needed for both efﬁciency 
and system security reasons. 
Consistency of methodology 
and definitions
There are several different credit risk 
measurement methods, each with 
inherent advantages and weaknesses. 
While multiple approaches may 
coexist within a banking group, cen-
tral sanctioning of the methods and 
deﬁnitions used is generally essential 
for transparency
3 and measurement 
consistency. Without such co-ordina-
tion, there is a high probability of 
generating unreliable output at the 
group level. 
Speciﬁcally, section 439 of the Basel 
II Framework requires that “Senior 
management also must have a good 
understanding of the rating system’s 
design and operation, and must ap-
prove material differences between 
established procedure and actual 
practice. ” If senior managers are to do 
this, they will need a high degree of 
system transparency in order to assess 
how any divergence from approved 
practice impacts the system’s output. 
At the same time, differing customer 
requirements call for market-speciﬁc 
customisation and in some cases 
for the use of speciﬁc techniques. A 
functional balance needs to be struck 
between developing consistency and 
responding to market-speciﬁc needs. 
In this regard, the risk system must 
capable of accommodating a diverse 
set of approaches easily and efﬁcient-
ly while also providing structure and 
deﬁnitional clarity. 
Transparency and flexibility
As noted above, system transparency 
and ﬂexibility are important consid-
erations for managing costs. Without 
these, the risk team will need to ex-
pend considerable energy explaining 
and eventually restructuring its system. 
For instance, given the number of 
parties charged with reviewing the 
credit risk system’s operations
4, the 
system’s overall structure needs to 
be clear and easy to follow. Other-
wise the risk team will be repeat-
edly forced to explain the system’s 
operations and, at an extreme, may 
even be forced to revise its system 
to eliminate any “black boxes.”
Furthermore, the Basel II frame-
work is expected to change going 
forward
5.  It is also reasonable to 
assume that users may engage in 
mergers and acquisitions. If the 
underlying risk system is inﬂexible, 
considerable costs will accrue  
when these changes need to  
be implemented. 
A note on scalability
Scalable systems should be capable 
of both scaling up and scaling out. 
These are not mutually exclusive 
choices. To scale up, from a hard-
ware perspective, means installing 
more powerful hardware
6. To scale 
out, on the other hand, means add-
ing more, not bigger hardware. 
When a user scales out, the size and 
speed of an individual machine does 
not limit total network capacity. 
Successfully scaled performance is 
not simply a function of installing 
more or faster processors or more 
or faster I/O devices. Scalability 
involves making choices between 
investing in SMP hardware, upgrad-
ing I/O configurations, making use 
of networked machines, reorganising 
your data, and how much you are 
willing to modify your application. 
SAS can both scale up – to fully  
utilise Symmetric multiprocessor 
(SMP) hardware, and also scale out 
  
1There may be a variety of reasons for this, including new product introductions, acquisition, local market issues etc.
  
2Ideally by those responsible for data capture and management, which for some data implies at group level
  
3User understanding of the system
  
4Regulators, senior management, auditors, etc. 
  
5See clause 18 in the Introduction to the Basel II Framework
  
6i.e. increasing the number of processors, disk drives, I/O channels on a single server machine.Journal of Risk Intelligence
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– to fully utilise distributed  
processors including support for 
GRID computing. Which approach 
(or combination) a user uses should 
be a function of their computing 
strategy. A SAS platform would not 
constrain this. This ability to scale up 
or out enables information system 
growth as business volumes and/or 
requirements change, without requir-
ing a correspondingly significant 
reinvestment in new hardware.
A note on metadata
Metadata is “data about data.” It con-
tains information about the source 
and format of the data, the changes 
the data has undergone and how 
the data should be used. Metadata 
allows a risk system to deliver both 
data consistency and a common 
understanding of defined fields. An 
effective metadata server should 
incorporate both technical and busi-
ness metadata. Technical metadata 
monitors data locations, the names 
of libraries and files, user names and 
passwords. Business metadata pro-
vides a semantic link between the 
information technology system and 
business users.
Within SAS, the entire end-to-end 
intelligence creation process can be 
documented on a metadata level. 
Repositories can be promoted from 
development to test to production, 
ensuring that users have access to 
the repository that meets accepted 
corporate quality standards. Changes 
are captured in audit logs that can be 
used to reconstruct information and/or 
meet audit trail requirements for either 
security or documentation purposes.
Because multiple data sources are 
supported through a common meta-
data layer, users may easily leverage 
existing database infrastructures. 
With the SAS Metadata Server, 
programmers may quickly reuse 
metadata structures from existing 
databases, eliminating the need to 
write and rewrite complex consoli-
dation programs. In addition, data 
only needs updated in one place, 
providing consistency and cost-
effective use of resources.
Summary
The way data is captured, dis-
seminated and and analysed across 
an enterprise can have significant 
implications on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of its risk management 
systems. Ultimately the success of 
any Basel II project is dependent 
on the data management approach. 
By focusing on the development of 
sound data foundations, risk  
platform developers will be able to  
both avoid costly false starts and 
materially improve their system’s  
efficiency and effectiveness. Journal of Risk Intelligence
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Operational risk – 
COSO re-examined
Peyman Mestchian, SAS EMEA; 
Mikhail Makarov, EVMTech;  
Bahram Mirzai, EVMTech
Operational risk, albeit not a new 
risk discipline, has gained fresh 
impetus in the light of Basel II. In 
order to promote and advance 
operational risk as a recognised and 
respected risk management disci-
pline, several criteria need to be met:
1.There needs to be a framework 
for operational risk management 
together with a common language 
across the industry;
2.A set of appropriate risk manage-
ment techniques and tools should 
be developed;
3.Firms need a thorough understand-
ing of their business processes.
The first two requirements are 
generic in nature, and therefore one 
can expect the methods developed 
for enterprise risk management to be 
applicable here as well. A number of 
institutions have considered apply-
ing the Committee for Sponsoring 
Organisations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) framework for 
operational risk management.
 The COSO approach is described in 
the Enterprise Risk Management—
Integrated Framework papers 
authored by COSO in 2004 [1, 2]. 
The Framework paper outlines an 
integrated approach to enterprise 
risk management. The Technical 
Application paper provides an over-
view of the methods and techniques 
used in enterprise risk management. 
Application of the COSO framework 
to operational risk has been recently 
criticised by Ali Samad-Khan [3]. We 
believe that although the effective-
ness of the COSO framework for 
operational risk remains to be seen 
in practice, the arguments put for-
ward by Samad-Khan are at best mis-
informed and at worst irresponsible.
Misinformed, because the primary 
focus on unexpected loss in his 
article defies the very principles of 
the Basel II Accord – namely the pro-
motion of risk governance, risk man-
agement (identification, assessment, 
monitoring and control/mitigation), 
and risk disclosure [4]. 
Operational risk is defined by the 
Basel Committee as “the risk of loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed 
business processes, people and 
systems or from external events”. 
Unexpected loss relates primarily 
to capital adequacy under Pillar 
1. However, there is more to risk 
management than capital adequacy. 
Consequently, Pillar 2 stresses the 
importance of a sound system of 
internal control and governance 
structure. It is through a COSO-type 
risk assessment approach that differ-
ent risk management needs can be 
aligned and integrated within one 
framework.
A recent paper presented to the 
Institute of Actuaries: “Quantifying 
Operational Risk in General 
Insurance Companies” [5] deviates 
from applying the traditional purely 
statistical approaches and concludes: 
“Whilst not purely strictly actuarial 
in some past senses of the word, 
this [operational risk management] 
means beginning by identifying, 
assessing and understanding opera-
tional risk, and being able to view 
various forms of control as important, 
as well as understanding their impact 
– all before using statistical mea-
surement techniques. This requires 
insight into, and understanding of 
process management, organisational 
design including defining roles and 
responsibilities, occupational psy-
chology and general management. 
The actuarial analytic training is good 
grounding for such work, but by no 
means a passport to success.”
Dr. Bahram Mirzai, CEFA is 
Managing Partner at EVMTech, a 
company specialising in op-
erational risk. He has more than 
seven years experience in risk 
management. In his last position 
he worked as senior vice presi-
dent and chief actuary for Swiss 
Re’s Global Banking Practice. 
He has led numerous consulting 
assignments with leading banks 
on operational risk management 
and has been frequently invited 
by regulators to speak on opera-
tional risk matters. 
Dr. Mikhail Makarov is Managing 
Partner at EVMTech, a company 
specialising in operational risk. 
He has more than ﬁve years of 
experience in risk management 
and has previously worked as 
an actuary at Swiss Re and as a 
lecturer at Ohio State University. Journal of Risk Intelligence
PAGE 20
Samad-Khan’s comments are 
irresponsible because a “reverse 
engineering” of some high-pro-
file operational risk failures in the 
banking history e.g. AIB, Barings or 
Sumitomo, shows that such events 
could have been avoided or discov-
ered in an early stage if a sound and 
integrated risk management frame-
work had been practiced. 
In the case of Barings, evidence has 
shown that COSO-based audits did 
actually identify and assess the risks 
correctly (e.g. lack of proper segrega-
tion of duties), but senior manage-
ment chose to ignore many of the 
assessment results. In fact, it is the 
study of such major failures that has 
resulted in COSO-based regulations 
such as Sarbanes-Oxley and risk-
based auditing, which is at the heart 
of most modern financial auditing 
standards. History has shown that it 
is dangerous to ignore this evidence 
both from methodological and legal 
points of view. 
The COSO-based risk assessment 
has been widely used in the risk 
management industry for many years 
in the financial and non-financial 
industries. An example of this is the 
approach advocated by the UK’s 
Financial Services Authority, who 
says in Consultation Paper 142: 
“A key issue is operational risk measure-
ment. Due to both data limitations and 
lack of high-powered analysis tools, 
a number of operational risks cannot 
be measured accurately in a quantita-
tive manner at the present time. So we 
use the term risk assessment in place 
of measurement, to encompass more 
qualitative processes, including for 
example the scoring of risks as ‘high’ , 
‘medium’ and ‘low’ . However, we would 
still encourage firms to collect data on 
their operational risks and to use mea-
surement tools where this is possible 
and appropriate. We believe that using 
a combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative tools is the best approach to 
understanding the significance of a firm’s 
operational risks. ”
The criticism provided by Samad-
Khan is based on the following main 
points:
1.The definition of the risk used by 
COSO is flawed;
2.A likelihood-impact risk assessment 
is flawed;
3.Methods prescribed by COSO are 
highly subjective, and only risk 
assessment based on historic losses 
is valid;
4.Risk assessment using COSO 
approach is too complex and 
resource intense.
In the following section we would 
like to comment on each of these 
points in some detail.
Definition of risk
Samad-Khan’s argument around the 
flawed definition of risk is based on 
the equation:
Risk = Likelihood x Impact.
There is no reference in COSO publi-
cations [1, 2] that this formula is used 
as a measure of risk. On the contrary, 
the COSO framework suggests use of 
Value at Risk or Capital at Risk con-
cepts as measures of risk.
Samad-Khan’s discussion of expected 
and unexpected loss may also lead to 
the wrong impression that only unex-
pected loss should be of importance 
for management of operational risk. 
According to such a view, a $100 
million loss in credit card frauds 
which occurs every year and thus 
has an expected loss contribution of 
$100 million and zero unexpected 
loss contribution should not be con-
sidered for risk assessment.
In fact what is important is the cost of 
risk expressed as
Cost of Risk = Expected Loss + Cost 
of Capital.
In other words, the cost of risk (CoR) 
is the sum of the expected loss and 
the cost of capital required to cover 
the unexpected loss. 
To illustrate how this formula is 
applied let us consider an example. 
Suppose that a bank has on aver-
age $300 million of operational risk 
losses per annum and holds $1.5 
billion of capital to cover the unex-
pected loss. Assuming that the cost 
of the capital for the bank is 5%, the 
CoR becomes:
Cost of Risk = 300 + 5% x 1500= 
$375 million.
Evaluation of the CoR is crucial to 
perform cost-benefit analysis within 
an integrated operational risk man-
agement framework, e.g., an organi-
sation’s willingness to take a risk will 
depend on whether or not the CoR 
justifies the anticipated returns. As the 
example shows, expected loss can 
play a dominant role in the analysis of 
the CoR.
For most risks, the contribution to the 
unexpected loss to CoR will be small 
and CoR will mainly be driven by the 
expected loss. It is only for rare and 
severe impact risks that the CoR is 
driven by the cost of capital.
 Consequently most of the reduction 
in CoR will come from the reduction 
in the expected loss. In this respect 
a COSO type framework, which not 
only focuses on management of rare 
risks but also on common risks, will 
prove useful.
Likelihood-impact based risk 
assessment
One of the approaches consid-
ered in the COSO framework is 
the likelihood-impact assessment. 
The likelihood-impact assessment 
was originally introduced in MIL-
STD-882A – a military system safety 
standard introduced by the US 
Department of Defense. This landmark 
document has been widely and suc-
cessfully used by risk and safety prac-
titioners since its introduction in 1977.Journal of Risk Intelligence
PAGE 21
This approach maps different risks 
into a matrix similar to the one 
shown in Figure 1.
 According to this approach, for each 
risk the frequency of occurrence 
(likelihood) and the worst credible 
outcome (impact) are assessed and 
captured into a likelihood-impact 
matrix. 
The likelihood-impact matrix is then 
compared with the risk appetite 
map. The risk appetite map outlines 
the maximum level of adverse risk 
outcome that an organisation is 
willing to accept. As a result of the 
comparison, any significant risk 
exceeding the risk appetite will call 
for management action. The matrix 
not only helps risk assessment but 
also allows portraying of risks. 
Risk assessment is often not per-
formed in terms of distributions but 
rather the results of a risk assessment 
are translated into severity and fre-
quency distributions. A well-known 
example of risk assessment is the 
credit rating of a company where 
the outcome of the assessment, e.g. 
company rating, is translated into 
frequency and severity distributions. 
Samad-Khan’s criticism of the likeli-
hood-impact approach is based on a 
misunderstanding. When likelihood-
impact assessment is used to check 
whether or not a risk exceeds the risk 
appetite levels, it is sufficient to esti-
mate only frequency and worst out-
comes of the risks. However, when 
a comprehensive risk assessment 
is required, one needs to estimate 
likelihood and impact for several 
outcomes of the risk.
For example, in a manner similar to 
credit risk assessment, it is possible 
to estimate frequency of losses (PD 
in credit terminology), expected 
impact (LGD in credit terminology) 
and worst credible impact (EAD 
in credit terminology). Cleary the 
results of such risk assessment can be 
translated into frequency and sever-
ity distributions, Fig 2.
Subjective versus statistical 
risk assessment 
It is interesting to observe the 
degree of antagonism between 
“business experts” and “statisti-
cians”. Business experts insist on 
use of subjective risk assessment 
and compare statistical analysis 
to driving a car by looking in the 
rear view mirror only. Statisticians 
on the other hand argue that sub-
jective assessment is best compa-
rable to predicting the future by 
looking into a crystal ball. 
Modern risk management frame-
works such as Basel II, COSO or 
MIL-STD-882 require integrated 
approaches combining both 
subjective and data driven risk 
assessment. The weight assigned 
to each approach is dependent on 
the degree of confidence given to 
each set of information. 
The necessity for using both 
approaches becomes especially 
apparent when assessing rare risks 
with extreme impact such as the 
World Trade Cetner or Tsunami 
events. Of course one may 
choose not to take into account 
the terrorism alert levels issued  
by the US government, since  
they incorporate some subjective 
judgment.
The practice of risk management 
shows that successful organisa-
tions have adopted a balanced and 
complementary approach using 
both subjective and data-driven 
risk assessment methods. Figure 3 
describes some examples of quan-
titative and qualitative techniques 
applicable to operational risk man-
agement.
Complexity of assessment 
process
The argument as to the complex-
ity and resource intensiveness of 
a COSO-type risk assessment is a 
misleading one. There are numer-
ous examples that such approaches 
have been applied with consider-
Figure 1: An example of a  
risk assessment using the  
likelihood-impact method.
Figure 2: Cumulative distributions of severity and aggregate risk.
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able success. The pioneering work 
embodied in MIL-STD-882 has been 
incorporated into system safety 
standards used in, for example, 
the chemical processing industry 
(EPA’s 40CFR68) and the medical 
device industry (the Food and Drug 
Administration’s requirements for Pre-
Market Notification). The semi-con-
ductor manufacturing and nuclear 
power industries use many system 
safety analytical techniques during 
the design of production processes, 
equipment and facilities, principally 
because the cost of “mistakes” is 
enormous in terms of production 
capability, product quality and, ulti-
mately, human life.
Obviously operational risk manage-
ment focus is not simply a more 
accurate measurement of risk but 
also a reduction of operational losses 
and the overall cost of operational 
risk. For most financial institutions 
a reduction of expected loss in 
the order of 10 percent would be 
sufficient to justify the risk assess-
ment process and to cover the cost 
of resources. We believe that the 
development of operational risk 
framework, tools and management 
techniques that would allow firms 
to reduce operational risk losses will 
remain a key priority beyond the 
implementation deadlines of Basel II. 
Conclusion
We strongly believe that the primary 
goal of operational risk management 
should be business success and value 
creation – more so than the fear 
of failing compliance tests or even 
ensuring capital adequacy – vital 
though these two secondary motiva-
tions should be.
The science and practice of opera-
tional risk management is evolving 
rapidly. To be successful, practitioners 
should be taking a multi-disciplinary 
approach bringing together the best 
of the disciplines of statistics, process 
management, finance, organisational 
design, total quality management 
and business strategy. Operational 
risk practitioners should be wary of 
specialists who are dogmatic in their 
approach. Ultimately, if the only tool 
in your tool-box is a hammer, every 
problem will start to look like a nail. 
To exclude any specific approaches 
or framework at the current stage of 
evolution of the subject is bound to 
result in a flawed and narrow-minded 
solution. Operational risk manage-
ment requires practitioners with open 
minds, the ability to learn from others 
and the flexibility to explore other 
methodologies.
Figure 3: Examples of qualitative and quantitative techniques.
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Fraud – data harvesting 
Is this the MRSA of personal  
information? 
By Tony Thomas, SAS UK
 
Have you ever wondered how your 
personal data gets in the hands of 
unscrupulous fraudsters? Victims of 
a fraud attack or an impersonation 
attempt are often blamed for being 
careless with their personal informa-
tion. In this fast moving world of 
computers, the Internet and swathes 
of personal paperwork, it is all too 
easy for us to blame ourselves for 
becoming the victim. The complexity 
of modern day computers, the fire-
walls, the Trojans, the virus checkers, 
the ‘phishing’ attacks and the dustbin 
raids all seem to point to you being 
the cause of your own downfall.
But even the most techno-savvy 
individual can have their defences 
breached – those who secure their 
computers, shred every valuable 
piece of paper, and cover all available 
theft gateways are still vulnerable.
How can this be?
Of course, you do not have exclusive 
control over your personal data. Just 
think about the number of compa-
nies and organisations who collect 
information about you. Think how 
many times you provide your bank 
details for standing orders or direct 
debits. Think of how many times 
you provide your mother’s maiden 
name, answer security questions and 
enter passwords. And think about 
how many times you use the same 
security question and passwords 
with different organisations. Have 
you ever thought about how secure 
the companies are at protecting your 
personal data? Has it ever crossed 
your mind that it might not be quite 
as secure as you think?
This is not just about banks and 
credit card companies, but all man-
ner of companies who you trust with 
your personal information such as 
telecom providers, utilities and even 
your local council.
A very worrying trend has emerged 
in recent years. Organised crime 
gangs have moved into white col-
lar crime, attracted by increasingly 
lucrative rewards and decreasing 
penalty thresholds, in the unlikely 
event that they are caught. Such 
gangs acquire sufficient personal 
information about individuals to 
either impersonate them to gain 
access to an account, or impersonate 
them to open accounts elsewhere to 
obtain credit in their name – credit 
that they do not, of course, repay.
How do they do this?
Simply by having someone on the 
inside, someone who works for the 
organisation to “harvest” the data – a 
“pharmer”, as they are known. These 
individuals are generally recruited by 
the fraudsters to work at a company, 
though in some cases they will bribe 
or threaten an existing employee. It is, 
therefore, highly likely that while you 
read this article there will be someone 
sifting through the records of a com-
pany that holds personal information 
about you. Your chances of being a 
victim appear to be less than contract-
ing MRSA
1  following an operation, but 
that is down to the larger pool that you 
swim in and not necessarily down to 
good practice at the companies who 
store your information.
Tony Thomas 
is the principal 
fraud consul-
tant to the Risk 
Management 
Practice for SAS 
UK & Ireland. 
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fraud prevention and detection 
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Fraud Prevention Team and Credit 
Risk Fraud Teams. His final post 
before joining us was as the Head 
of Central Fraud Operations, where 
he managed the operation, policy 
and strategy for the prevention 
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Bank. He has worked very closely 
with most of the fraud commu-
nity within the financial services 
industry, having been a co-founder 
and chair of the National Hunter 
Association, the chair of the 
Council of Mortgage Lenders Fraud 
Panel and an active member of the 
British Bankers Association Fraud 
Committee.
1Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) is a type of bacteria that is resistant to certainantibiotics.  The antibiotics include methicillin and 
other more common antibiotics such as oxacillin, penicillin and amoxicillin. Staph infections, including MRSA, occur most frequently among persons 
in hospitals and healthcare facilities (such as nursing homes and dialysis centres) who have weakened immune systems.Journal of Risk Intelligence
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What protection is there for 
the consumer?
There is a raft of legislation, codes of 
conduct and best practice guidelines 
in place to protect us from this 21st 
century scourge. Sadly, the reality is 
that companies are using pre-21st 
century methods to fight the spread 
of this disease. To continue the com-
parison with MRSA, basic hygiene 
methods are not going to provide the 
necessary route to cure.
Financial institutions have been 
aware of this issue for a long time 
and admit privately that it is a major 
concern. They have investigation 
teams that look into reported cases of 
fraud and attempt to find employees 
who have been involved. Invariably 
they find an individual, but only 
after considerable damage has been 
caused to a large number of custom-
ers. Furthermore, the investigations 
are reactive in that they take place 
well after the event; they are not pro-
active in catching the source of the 
leaks at an earlier stage.
Even after a perpetrator has been 
caught, it is very difficult to provide 
enough evidence for a criminal 
prosecution. Usually, the pharmers 
are sacked and the matter taken no 
further. Evidence suggests that these 
individuals then move to another 
company where they continue their 
criminal activity unabated. And what 
of their gang masters? Even when 
someone is caught and threatened 
with prosecution, they are too scared 
to give up the names of the organis-
ers. So the fraud “super bug” contin-
ues to thrive.
Is there anything that can  
be done?
Companies must adopt two key mea-
sures to control information leaks. 
The first is relatively easy. Companies 
need to tighten up their recruitment 
policies. Over the last decade there 
has been a loosening of checks made 
on individuals when they are first 
employed. References are often not 
followed up, and gaps in employ-
ment histories are left without thor-
ough investigation. Credit checks 
and residency confirmation are rarely 
carried out. Tightening these controls 
will make it harder for pharmers to 
get inside a business.
This measure is not going to stop all 
the harvesting. Some fraudsters will 
get through the recruitment stage. 
So the second part of the solution 
needs to concentrate on the informa-
tion source. All the information that 
a pharmer passes on to the fraud 
community is contained within a 
computer system, and all of these 
systems contain audit trails, which in 
turn contain enough information to 
determine who did what, with which 
customer and when. So whether it is 
a transaction over an account or just 
a viewing of the information, the trail 
is available to track activity. In a stan-
dard investigation, this is the histori-
cal information that an investigator 
will use to look for the source of a 
leak. The trouble is that many people 
will have looked at an account – 
which one is the perpetrator? There is 
likely to be more than one audit trail 
to review, and the investigator only 
gets onto the trail after a customer 
has been defrauded.
So the second measure requires a lit-
tle more investment, but carries with 
it the power to root out a fraudster at 
a much earlier stage in their career. 
The key is to turn a reactive process 
into a proactive detection system, by 
pooling all the data from the sepa-
rate audit trails into one data mart. 
From this information the company 
can then profile the standard daily 
activity of each job role and measure 
each individual’s activity against the 
expected norm. Anyone whose activ-
ity is deemed to be outside the profile 
is flagged for investigation.
The use of such a system will:
• Identify perpetrators at an early 
stage in the cycle.
• Identify other misuses of the  
systems.
• Detect sales malpractice.
• Speed up investigations. 
• Serve as a deterrent.
Obviously this all comes at a cost, 
but in an environment of increasing 
statutory compliance and reputation-
conscious consumers, can compa-
nies continue to play into the hands 
of the criminal fraternity? Should the 
customer continue to accept that 
there is no solution to the “fraud 
super bug”? Journal of Risk Intelligence
PAGE 25
Anti-money laundering
Toward a better understand-
ing of the use of IT systems 
for best-practice compliance
Rowan Bosworth-Davies, SAS EMEA
 
Much discussion has been generated 
on the definitions and the application 
of so-called ‘artificial intelligence’ 
models, or more usually ‘intelligent 
systems’ for detecting money laun-
dering. First of all, it is incorrect to 
describe such offerings as providing 
“detection” capabilities. They can-
not do this. IT systems can provide 
a platform for the support of a legal 
and regulatory case for determining 
‘best practice’, but suggesting that any 
IT offering can replace the entirely 
human decision-making process is to 
miss the point of the problem.
Demonstrating a high standard of 
“know your customer” intelligence-
gathering is an ongoing requirement 
and is crucial to the provision of effec-
tive disclosure of “suspicious” trans-
actions. How can any practitioner 
properly demonstrate ”best practice” 
adherence to the ability to disclose 
suspicious transactions unless he can 
show that he has a full knowledge of 
his customers, his business, his finan-
cial profile and his future ambitions?
Identifying suspicious transactions 
is itself a wholly subjective process, 
a feature of the legislation that has 
always proved to be a major stum-
bling block in creating a level play-
ing field in compliance procedures. 
Suspicion is purely subjective, and 
what makes one person suspicious 
may not apply to another. This will 
remain true regardless of whether 
governments (such as the UK or 
South Africa) seek to impose objec-
tive standards of suspicion. In these 
cases, the court will still need to 
prove the absence of a subjective 
judgement before going on to test 
whether the objective (or nonperson-
alised) standard of suspicion should 
have been identified.
Trying, therefore, to model a series 
of activities that can in any way be 
said to reflect predetermined suspi-
cious characteristics accurately,  
and upon which MLROs can rely 
with sufficient accuracy, is only of 
limited value. We can only deter-
mine, with the benefit of hindsight, 
that any particular activity is laun-
dering-specific, because it is a sys-
tem that has been identified in the 
past, and has now been exposed. 
Professional launderers do not make 
a habit of using techniques and 
methods which are already well 
known to regulators and law enforc-
ers, and they adapt their techniques 
accordingly. 
Ironically, money launderers do not 
need to take a great deal of trouble 
in changing their tactics, because 
the whole concept of money laun-
dering is incapable of specific 
definition. Money laundering is 
merely the egregious use of the 
world’s commercial, professional, 
transactional payment and financial 
delivery systems to move criminally-
tainted money. Sticking as closely 
as possible to traditional payment 
routes and maintaining ordinary 
commercial transactional activity 
is the best defence against being 
uncovered as a money launderer. 
It is perfectly possible to take two 
sets of transactions – one legiti-
mate and one criminal – withdraw 
the proceeds from the same bank 
account, move them through the 
same financial products, channel 
them through the same lawyer’s cli-
ent account, use them to purchase 
the same financial investments liq-
uidate their proceeds, route them 
through the same offshore jurisdic-
tion and have the money reappear 
in the same end-user bank account. 
The only way to determine the dif-
ference is by knowing the original 
provenance of the money, and that 
is predicated upon being able to 
demonstrate a practical application 
of KYC procedures. 
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The most that any IT product pro-
vider can hope to claim is that they 
offer a tool, which can assist the 
MLRO function to aid his or her 
department’s attempts to achieve a 
high standard of best practice. No 
product offering should claim a 
detection capability, or refer to its 
findings as suspicious, because that 
immediately would put the user into 
a legal and regulatory difficulty. If the 
user were to both philosophically 
and semantically accept that the IT 
system is really detecting suspicious 
transactions, then he or she would 
immediately face the need to disclose 
all such reports immediately, in the 
absence of any further examination 
or evaluation. 
The primary focus, for the demonstra-
tion of ‘best practice’, is that the anti-
money laundering approach adopted 
must be ‘risk based’ and proportion-
ate to the risk, which means first 
analysing and identifying the level of 
risk to be managed by each client. If 
clients are now to be faced with the 
likelihood of paying significant sums 
of money for IT systems which may 
not even provide them the ability to 
improve, not to mention failing to 
provide them with a requisite return 
on investment, then they would be 
forgiven for demonstrating a wil-
ful reluctance to consider any such 
applications at all.
A practicable rules-based system, 
with a proportionate capability to 
provide a robust form of data mining 
to manage the ongoing transaction 
monitoring requirement; and coupled 
with a very user-friendly workflow 
management offering, should be all 
that most institutions need to con-
sider, certainly in the first stages of 
development. Such rules need to be 
capable of being flexibly defined in 
the widest possible business envi-
ronment, so that such a tool can be 
applied in the widest variety of finan-
cial applications.
The primary need is to identify 
‘unusual’ transactions which are 
exceptions to the ordinary rule of 
the client’s ‘normal’ business pattern 
of activity. Once identified, those 
exceptions need to be analysed to 
ascertain whether they really are ‘sus-
picious’ as far as the MLRO is con-
cerned, or whether they are merely 
unusual within the overall pattern of 
client behaviour, but still capable of 
rational explanation. In most cases, 
and using a risk-based approach, 
the vast majority of such exception 
transactions should not create a 
huge amount of ‘noise’. A risk-based 
approach allows practitioners to start 
from the perfectly reasonable prem-
ise that their clients are law-abiding 
citizens whose usage of their banking 
systems will be correct, normal, and 
unremarkable. Identifying a pattern 
of exception transactions when set 
against the ‘normal’ conduct of the 
account is not complicated and can 
be easily achieved through the use of 
existing, robust data mining systems.
Once relevant exception transactions 
have been identified, such limited 
activities can then be tested by a 
rules engine to ascertain which spe-
cific rules have been broken, and if 
necessary, what actions can or should 
be further taken to ascertain whether 
such a transaction needs to be dis-
closed. It is in the definition of these 
rules that the expertise of the appli-
cation, and its architect comes into 
its own. Rules will have to be con-
structed differently depending upon 
jurisdiction and geography and regu-
latory regime requirement. What will 
apply in the UK will not necessarily 
work in other countries. US require-
ments, particularly their routine BSA 
and SAR reporting, are almost always 
inapplicable in non-US jurisdictions, 
except in those cases of financial 
institutions which are subject to US 
oversight. Installing US-style regula-
tory requirements in non-US financial 
regulatory applications is both addi-
tionally cost-intensive and culturally 
unattractive. There are other ways of 
ensuring that a non-US bank does 
not fall foul of US extraterritorial 
ambitions.
Financial practitioners constantly 
reiterate the need for simplicity and 
limitation in the number of rules 
they want to see applied. The risks 
being managed are the institution’s 
risks, and they should be capable of 
defining the level of awareness and 
management which they wish to 
bring to the application. Therefore, 
all rules should be capable of being 
calibrated with risk weightings, so 
that the individual institution can 
‘fine tune’ them to their own require-
ments. The aim is to be able to permit 
the institution to manage only those 
transactions which give it greatest 
cause for concern, and not to force 
it to have to deal with a whole load 
of irrelevant ‘noise’ on the screen. 
Every exception report generated 
will have to be examined: it will not 
be possible to ignore some reports 
and focus on others. Therefore, the 
primary need is to be able to cali-
brate the rate of ‘hits’ with which the 
institution wishes to deal. As long as 
this is firmly and clearly written into 
the risk profile of the institution con-
cerned and documented accurately 
and discussed and understood by the 
regulator, there is no need to create 
unnecessary exception reporting.
There is no ‘one size fits all’ applica-
tion in this market. Each institution is 
different, has different philosophical 
approaches to its view of the market, 
has different risk-management prac-
tices and different compliance tool 
needs. Thus the need is for maximum 
flexibility, so that the institution can 
remain completely in control of its 
own risk management, which can be 
calibrated in accordance with its own 
risk management policies.
The issues that need to be considered 
are what level of product offering will 
be commensurate with the client’s 
immediate needs. This starts with the 
provision of an absolutely basic tool Journal of Risk Intelligence
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kit, complete with a minimal number 
of rules, which the client must agree 
at the start. There will be a minimal 
amount of prescoping and postsale 
implementation costs. Once the 
system is installed, and working sat-
isfactorily to the client’s needs, other 
rules and further refinements can be 
added. 
Clients have repeatedly demon-
strated that they do not want pure 
consultancy-led offerings because 
of the unquantifiable level of costs. 
Those who do not understand this 
basic issue will simply not succeed. 
Anti-money laundering tools should 
be simple to use, and should not 
have to involve huge capital expen-
diture. They are not looked upon 
with any degree of optimism by most 
institutions, and those who seek to 
provide them must demonstrate that 
they have both significant domain 
expertise in AML  best practice and 
are capable of delivering products at 
a competitive, cost-effective price.
Anti-money laundering systems 
should be seen as nothing more 
than basic tools that allow financial 
institutions to know their custom-
ers better. In so doing, they can be 
better seen in their rightful context, 
which is really as client relation-
ship management products. Once 
this idea is grasped, and their value 
better understood, then clients will 
be more willing to consider further 
additions to the tool kit, at a later 
stage, and the original offering will 
be seen to provide a far better man-
agement tool than would have been 
originally identified.
Money laundering is a regulatory 
risk, and financial institutions are 
experts at managing risks. An anti-
money laundering tool should assist 
in the management of that risk. It 
should not become a bigger problem 
in itself.
 Journal of Risk Intelligence
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Mitigating ﬁnancial 
services risk with  
component business 
modelling (CBM)
Martin Gibbon, IBM
 
Holding money. Protecting it. 
Investing it. Using it to make even 
more money. What’s not risky about 
that?
At its most fundamental level, bank-
ing is all about managing risk, and 
doing it well isn’t an option. It’s a 
necessity – the cost of staying in the 
game. Innovative financial institu-
tions are joining in the fight to reduce 
that cost, however, and component 
business modeling (CBM) is fast 
becoming a weapon of choice.
Choice doesn’t enter the discussion, 
though, when it comes to the regu-
latory aspects of risk management. 
Banks – large and small, local and 
global – are expected to comply with 
the increasingly stringent demands 
of industry and legislative initiatives 
such as Basel II, Sarbanes-Oxley, the 
USA PATRIOT Act and International 
Financial Reporting Standards – all 
of which can combine to confound 
even the most well-run bank’s 
attempts to stay on the black side of 
profit margins.
It costs money to implement anti-
money laundering programs, set up 
procedures to protect against fraud 
and guarantee compliance with trad-
ing rules. And in a business environ-
ment that features lackluster interest 
rates, rising overhead and swarming 
competitors who used to be satis-
fied just being department stores and 
supermarkets, additional expendi-
tures serve only to narrow already 
thinning margins.
Getting holistic
Risk management and compliance 
may be non-negotiable, but fortu-
nately banks have a choice in the 
way they go about meeting those 
requirements. They can address them 
independently and separately, creat-
ing stovepipe projects, or they can 
take a more holistic approach and 
try to integrate risk management pro-
grams on an enterprisewide basis to 
achieve economies of scale.
There are similarities, after all, in 
risk and compliance issues requir-
ing bank attention, which means 
synergies might be uncovered in the 
strategic application of programs to 
address those issues. Fraud preven-
tion and anti-money laundering 
procedures, for instance, involve 
similar architectures for monitoring 
transactions, identifying patterns and 
creating alerts. The use of data ware-
housing technology also can be simi-
lar in terms of system design. Models 
may differ, but the implementation 
of common architectures can help 
lower operational costs.
The best-case scenario, however, 
involves banks actually taking advan-
tage of regulatory mandates to put 
in place risk management systems 
whose scope and power can be 
leveraged to improve business and 
shareholder value by increasing rev-
enue, market share and profits. CBM 
is one way forward-looking financial 
institutions are analyzing where in 
their organizations risk management 
and regulatory compliance require-
ments can be consolidated and 
exploited to squeeze more out of the 
whole than might be suggested ini-
tially by the sum of the parts.
CBM helps a bank connect its orga-
nizational processes with its business 
strategy and appropriate technologi-
cal solutions, facilitating fact-based 
decisions about the most effective 
methods for managing change. 
Deconstructing a bank’s business 
operations into components – similar 
activities that utilize the same data 
– puts into clear focus the tenden-
cies a bank may have to collaborate 
or not collaborate across product 
lines, functions and geographies. At 
Martin Gibbon leads risk and 
compliance for financial markets 
and banking for IBM Business 
Consulting Services, IBM North 
Region (United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Netherlands and South Africa). Journal of Risk Intelligence
PAGE 29
the same time, componentization 
points the way toward eliminating 
redundancies, closing gaps, and 
improving efficiency and resilience. 
Key CBM activities can include:
• Defining discrete components in 
terms of business processes, orga-
nization, operations and support-
ing technology.
• Linking the consumption of 
resources with revenue generation 
and competitive performance.
• Analyzing underlying competencies 
to identify discrepancies between 
the way business processes are and 
the way they could be.
• Highlighting system and applica-
tion gaps, duplicate processes and 
overextensions.
• Identifying collaborative patterns 
to help transform business perfor-
mance.
• Ultimately producing a plan to 
repurpose existing facilities and 
develop new processes, organi-
zational structures and systems.
Tipping the scale
As banks begin to restructure them-
selves into component-based busi-
nesses, they often are able to leverage 
the potential of an on demand IT 
environment, combining seamless 
connectivity and efficiencies with 
the advantages of specialization and 
scale found in a fully networked busi-
ness. In the specific area of risk and 
compliance, CBM can help banks:
• Identify ways to remain compli-
ant and restructure with less 
effort, risk and cost.
• Highlight “hot spots” for immedi-
ate attention.
• Solve problems innovatively, such 
as through global sourcing of 
noncore tasks and processes.
In essence, CBM offers a top-down 
view of risk and compliance ele-
ments, and it begins by helping to 
answer some fundamental questions 
about how to appropriately and cost-
effectively isolate risk- and compli-
ance-related activities. Are there units 
within the bank that are specifically in 
charge of risk and compliance? If so, 
a bank may decide to focus chiefly on 
those organizations. Should the entire 
bank be assessed, or just the whole-
sale side of the house? Should the 
examination be limited to individual 
units, or extended to the group level? 
CBM helps first to define the ques-
tions and then to uncover the corre-
sponding answers.
Inside the area of regulatory com-
pliance, for instance, CBM may 
lead to the identification of risk 
management, control, governance, 
monitoring and external reporting 
components within the larger, overall 
function. Using that information, a 
bank can help ensure that the right 
business processes are addressed 
and build an adaptive, cost-effective 
system to quickly respond to con-
tinuing regulatory changes.
At the same time, separating a bank’s 
business processes into individual 
components can help identify high-
revenue, low-cost activities that offer 
the potential for fast returns. It may 
be advantageous, for instance, for a 
financial institution to focus on exter-
nal fraud first and internal security 
later. CBM often makes it abundantly 
clear where a bank’s priorities lie and 
points the way to quick wins.
Lastly, banks can utilize CBM to 
uncover and address problems 
in innovative, cost-efficient ways. 
Citibank, for instance, has applied 
some of the financial controls and risk 
management models of its corporate 
bank to its consumer business, updat-
ing its global risk reporting database 
three times a day to give it the capac-
ity to make hair-trigger decisions.
1  
Another global banking business, 
facing the prospect of an international 
loss database that needed to capture 
data at a granular organisational level, 
used CBM techniques to consider 
establishing its own infrastructure to 
handle the job. It quickly discovered 
that, over a three-year period, it could 
outsource the service and cut costs by 
nearly 80 percent.
2 
The bottom line is that many banks 
are meeting the challenge of regula-
tory compliance and risk manage-
ment by using CBM to enhance 
existing system infrastructures, auto-
mate appropriate procedures and 
build in more resilience. By imple-
menting a single, integrated variable-
cost IT solution that goes beyond 
compliance to meet many require-
ments, banks can optimize revenues 
through the reduction of fraud and 
bad debt; cut costs by streamlining 
collection, delinquency and recovery 
processes; and use risk-based pric-
ing to improve credit assessment. 
It also makes sense to leverage risk 
management investments to improve 
customer relationship manage-
ment, especially by utilizing existing 
databases and analytical engines to 
uncover additional customer oppor-
tunities.
There’s no doubt about it. Banking 
is a risky business and always will 
be. But using CBM to restructure 
processes around cost-effective, enter-
prisewide technological solutions 
can help significantly reduce losses 
and optimize compliance. Central to 
the effectiveness of that strategy is a 
mindset that treats risk management 
and compliance expenditures not just 
as a cost, but as an investment with 
the potential to significantly increase 
a bank’s risk … of success. 
1Company Web sites; BankTech; IBM Institute for Business Value.
2IBM client engagement.Journal of Risk Intelligence
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Sarbanes-Oxley and 
outsourcing
Time is running out for  
non-US companies
Luc Klein, LogicaCMG
 
As companies choose to devote key 
resources to core business activities, it 
is increasingly common for support-
ing functions to be outsourced. These 
often include IT-intensive activities 
such as information processing, claims 
management and payroll. Drivers for 
outsourcing include more efficient 
and effective cost and risk manage-
ment, as well as improved service 
delivery and greater speed to market.
Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX), section 404, organisations 
are responsible for ensuring that the 
service providers of any outsourced 
functions have documented their 
financial processes, carried out a risk 
assessment and have in place ade-
quate controls over financial report-
ing, which have been thoroughly 
tested for their effectiveness. This 
responsibility can never be delegated 
to the service provider by the user 
organisation.
Richard Gincel of Infoworld states: 
“Ultimately, two frameworks are 
required: one for business and one 
for IT. The business side needs to 
develop a management infrastructure 
to establish and maintain internal 
controls and repeatable processes 
that ensure reliable regulatory 
compliance. IT needs a technology 
framework that capitalises on existing 
resources and makes point solutions 
the exception rather that the rule”.
In addressing SOX requirements, 
companies (particularly user organi-
sations) must ask:
• What outsourced processes may 
affect our financial statements?
• How do we know that our service 
providers have conducted proper 
risk assessments focussing on pro-
cesses, systems and people?
• How do we know that our service 
providers have effective controls 
in place to mitigate, eliminate or 
avoid risks?
• How do we know that changes to 
outsourced processes or systems 
will not have a material affect on 
our financial information?
There are two approaches to  
answering these questions:
1.The user may have its internal or   
external auditor conduct an audit 
of its service provider.
2.The service provider may have its 
own external auditor provide audit 
reports to the user.
Auditing your service provider
If a user organisation has large con-
trol over its outsourced activities, 
then it may need to be involved in 
performing risk and control assess-
ments of the service provider, as well 
as testing that the controls are effec-
tive. The user organisation may ulti-
mately use internal or external audit to 
evaluate its service provider’s control 
environment as an extension of nor-
mal audit procedures. It is important 
to determine contractual provisions 
for financial control auditing and to 
agree the audit process between the 
user and service provider.Journal of Risk Intelligence
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In some cases, it may not be practi-
cal to audit service providers from 
a service providers’ standpoint. This 
may be particularly true when multi-
ple clients seek audits that may place 
burdens on the service provider’s 
resources, each looking for a range 
of assurances about internal controls.
Reliance on service  
provider audits
Service providers may opt for a 
Statement on Auditing Standards 
(SAS) No. 70, Service Organisations. 
This is an internationally recognised 
auditing standard developed by the 
American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA)
SAS 70 is accepted under SOX in 
relation to section 404. A SAS 70 
audit involves an external, indepen-
dent evaluation of service provider 
controls, their execution and effec-
tiveness. The audit, often conducted 
by the service provider’s external 
auditor, addresses critical bench-
marks, including completeness, 
accuracy and timelines of the control 
activities and processes.
There are two types of SAS 70 audit 
reports. Type I describes the service 
provider’s internal controls at a 
specific point in time, for example 
at fiscal year-end. Type II not only 
includes controls, but also detailed 
testing of them over a minimum six 
month period.
With a SAS 70 report, user organisa-
tions will not have to conduct their 
own audit of the service provider’s 
controls. Service providers may use 
a SAS 70 report for commercial 
purposes as well. SOX compliance 
and provision of a SAS 70 report 
as a standard can offer competitive 
advantage.
Non-US companies have  
some respite
On 2nd March 2005 the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) extended the deadline for SOX 
compliance by one year to 15th July 
2006. This means that companies 
whose fiscal year is the same as the 
calendar year must be compliant by 
31st December 2006. But, this does 
not mean that non-US companies 
now can sit back or slow down their 
SOX programme. Two different sur-
veys from September 2004 suggest 
that companies are either only at the 
very early stages of planning their 
SOX 404 project (69 percent accord-
ing to ARC Morgan) or are behind 
schedule (51 percent according to 
the 404 Institute/KPMG). Companies 
that need a SAS 70 Type II report 
must be aware that the overall pro-
cess is clearly documented and well 
understood by the organisation and 
the auditors before it is tested for a 
minimum period of six months. In 
many cases this in itself will be con-
siderable undertaking.
Other issues
Problems may arise when there is a 
discrepancy between the timing of a 
SAS 70 report and year-end report-
ing. Conducting SAS 70 audits on a 
quarterly basis is one solution, but 
this increases the overhead. In addi-
tion, when service providers start to 
get their house in order too late, they 
may find the Type II testing period 
of six months minimum challenges 
their compliance deadline, and 
hence the SOX deadline for the user 
organisation, their customers.
Another issue could arise when 
both the user organisation and the 
service provider have the same exter-
nal auditor, leading to a possible 
conflict of interest under SOX. The 
SEC states that the user organisation 
can still rely on the SAS 70 Type II 
report. However, if the user organisa-
tion were to engage its audit firm to 
prepare the SAS 70 Type II report on 
the service provider, they would not 
be able to reply on it for purposes of 
assessing internal control over finan-
cial reporting.
Recently, some organisations have 
required a SAS 70 statement from 
their suppliers, even though the 
services provided were not out-
sourced. It is therefore important to 
determine (by mutual agreement) 
whether or not the services provided 
are considered to be outsourced 
activities. Definitions vary, with most 
typically defining outsourced activi-
ties as those transferred to a third 
party that otherwise would have 
been administered in-house. The 
American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (July 2004) states that 
SAS 70 is applicable only if the ser-
vice is part of the user organisation’s 
information system. SAS 70 is not 
relevant to situations in which the 
services provided are limited to 
executing client organisation trans-
actions that are specifically autho-
rised by the client, such as cheque 
account transaction processing by a 
bank or the execution of securities 
transactions by the broker.
In some cases an alternative standard 
may be used, provided that it cov-
ers (grosso modo) the same grounds 
as a SAS 70 statement. An example 
is a FRAG21 statement, reports on 
internal controls of investment custo-
dians made available to third parties, 
issued by the Audit Faculty of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales. In case of doubt, 
auditors can advise on the best stan-
dard to meet the relevant situation.
Some companies may look at del-
isting in the US as a rigorous solu-
tion to avoiding SOX compliance. 
However, as long as there are at least 
300 US shareholders, it will remain 
subject to the SEC’s disclosure sys-
tem and SOX. A delisted non-US 
company could offer to buy back 
all shares from US shareholders. 
However, according to Robert C. Journal of Risk Intelligence
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Pozen in March 2004 Harvard Law 
School discussion paper, “the share-
holders would almost certainly 
reject the offer, because of owner-
ship splitting, price disagreement or 
pure inertia”.
A key objective for outsourcing is 
effective risk management, passing 
as much as possible to the service 
provider. Yet SOX states that the 
user organisaton remains respon-
sible for the service provider’s inter-
nal controls, thereby debilitating 
the initial objective. The impact of 
SOX on the growth of outsourcing 
remains to be seen.
Conclusion
Under SOX, companies are not only 
responsible for having their internal 
processes in order, but they also 
remain responsible for controls of any 
outsourced activities. User and ser-
vice providers have various options 
open to them. Either users can ensure 
service provider compliance by 
conducting an audit themselves (by 
either their own internal or external 
auditor). Or user organisations can 
rely on audits provided by their ser-
vice provider by means of a SAS 70 
(or similar) statement by the service 
provider’s auditor. There are also 
specific issues organisations have to 
be aware of, such as the timing of 
a SAS 70 statement; or the possibil-
ity of using an alternative standard. 
Non-US companies may have some 
respite with the extended deadline. 
However, those companies which 
are at the early stages of planning 
or worse, have yet to start, may find 
themselves fighting an uphill battle 
and may have to employ additional 
capability and resources to meet the 
SOX deadline.Journal of Risk Intelligence
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Risk matters –  
Recent developments in the 
risk management marketplace  
 
Common reporting framework 
developed for EU
LONDON – Europe’s banking regu-
lators have developed a common 
financial reporting framework for 
banks designed to be consistent 
with new international accounting 
rules.
The committee of European bank-
ing supervisors (CEBS) said they 
want European Union supervisors 
to use the framework when they 
ask banks for consolidated financial 
information prepared in accor-
dance with the new rules, known 
as International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). The framework 
was outlined in a consultation paper 
issued in early April.
Solvency II first draft expected 
in October
BRUSSELS – The first draft of a 
revised ‘roadmap’ for Europe’s risk-
based Solvency II project, which 
is aimed at making insurers safer, 
should be ready for discussion by 
October. The draft will contain 
major parts of the Solvency II  
framework directive.
The latest roadmap confirms that the 
European Commission – the execu-
tive arm of the 25-nation European 
Union – aims to adopt the draft law 
in October 2006. That is a year later 
than planned in the earlier roadmap 
issued in July last year.
QIS 5 details confirmed
BASEL, Switzerland – Global bank-
ing regulators confirmed in late 
March that they would undertake a 
fifth quantitative impact study – QIS 
5 – into the effects of the complex 
Basel II upgrade of international 
capital riles for bank safety. The study 
will take place between October and 
December this year.
The Basel regulators will review the 
calibration of Basel II in the spring 
of 2006. The committee believed 
this earlier date for potential reca-
libration will provide banks with 
more time to study the expected 
effects of the Basel II rules and aid 
implementation plans.
Regulators issue key trading 
book proposals
BASEL – Banks and investment firms 
are likely to give a mixed reception 
to new regulatory proposals deal-
ing with their trading book risks, 
published on April 11. The proposals 
represent one of the main unfinished 
aspects of the new Basel accord 
(Basel II) governing bank capital, 
which was published last June fol-
lowing six years of negotiations. The 
proposed rules that resulted from 
those negotiations are viewed by 
some financial firms as more appro-
priate to risk in the banking book 
than the trading book.
Survey of risk management & 
quantitative finance salaries
The market for risk management 
professionals has enjoyed a steady 
growth during 2004/05, according 
to a survey by Morgan McKinley. 
Hiring volumes are currently at the 
highest levels for a number of years. 
Compensation in key areas, particu-
larly for top-end market and credit 
risk managers, has increased signifi-
cantly in the last 12 months.Journal of Risk Intelligence
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SAS expands lead in credit risk 
management software
More than 20 banks and finan-
cial services organisations world-
wide selected SAS
® Credit Risk 
Management and SAS Credit Scoring 
for Banking in 2004 to assist with 
the capital adequacy and risk gover-
nance requirements of the New Basel 
Capital Accord (Basel II). 
Customers selecting SAS credit 
risk solutions include: Argenta 
Spaarbank, AXA Bank, Banif 
Banco, BNbank, Deltabank, Erste 
Bank, GMAC-RFC, Handelsbanken 
Rahoitus, HBOS, Kookmin Bank, 
National Australia Bank, Samlink, 
Sampo Bank, and SEB. 
SAS maintains its leadership in 
enterprisewide risk management 
through continued global investment 
and dedicated risk practices set up 
to support Basel II customers at both 
the regional and local level. Credit 
risk is a pressing issue for financial 
institutions due to the regulatory 
imperatives of Basel II and the desire 
to improve business practices sur-
rounding credit risk management. 
Organisations recognise that SAS 
Credit Risk Management addresses 
Basel II compliance and beyond. 
Latest version of SAS Credit 
Risk Management touts several 
enhancements 
As a continued part of the SAS
® 
Banking Intelligence Solutions, 
the new version of SAS Credit Risk 
Management helps banks improve 
capital allocation, increase profit-
ability and maximise returns for 
shareholders more efficiently. 
Enhancements include: 
• Preconfigured analytics for calcu-
lating regulatory capital and the 
capability to compute economic 
capital. Organisations can define 
different calculation methods by 
asset class and perform all neces-
sary computations in one environ-
ment. Users can store preferences 
based on different regulatory 
needs.
• Unique capability to optimise risk 
mitigants by counterparty.
• Seamless resource integration that 
allows users to dynamically link 
models for estimating probabilities 
of default and loss given default. 
• Web-based interface that performs 
ad hoc analyses, supplies drill-down 
reports, offers customisable data 
and publishes regulatory reports.
SAS making strides with new 
operational risk management 
software
To meet the growing need for risk 
management controls, SAS has 
announced SAS
® OpRisk Monitor, a 
Web-based application that collects, 
manages, tracks and reports informa-
tion about operational loss events, 
key risk indicators, and risk and con-
trol assessments.
Société Générale Group, one of 
the largest financial services groups 
in the Eurozone, selected SAS for 
its operational risk management 
needs. “Operational risk manage-
ment is still evolving SAS’ industry 
expertise, solution scalability and 
its continued investment in this area 
was a key factor in our decision to 
select SAS as the standard for opera-
tional risk management across the 
entire Société Générale Group,” said 
Martine Tribulet, project manager for 
Basel II/operational risk at Société 
Générale Group. 
“Effectively monitoring and control-
ling internal operational risks is a 
strategic issue for us. We wanted a 
best-practice solution that could take 
us beyond regulatory compliance,” 
said Tribulet. “We are working closely 
Risk & quantitative finance salaries
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Annual Bonus 
%
Credit Risk £32-£42K 20 £40-£55K 30 £50-£85K 50 £85-£140K 70
Market Risk £32-£45K 20 £45-£60K 40 £50-£95K 60 £95-£175K 150
Operational Risk £32-£40K 10 £45-£55K 20 £45-£85K 40 £85-£140K 70
Model Validation £32-£45K 20 £45-£60K 30 £50-£95K 50 £95-£140K 80
Pricing / Valuation £27-£40K 15 £40-£50K 25 £45-£90K 40 £90-£130K 60
Quantitative Finance £40-£60K 50 £60-£70K 60 £65-£110K 80 £110-£175K 150
Source: Morgan McKinley 2005Journal of Risk Intelligence
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with SAS on developing an inte-
grated solution that fully supports 
our quantitative and qualitative 
approach to the management of 
operational risk. By identifying the 
business benefits of op risk man-
agement at an early stage, Société 
Générale will enjoy a competitive 
advantage in the lead-up to the 
Basel II deadline.” 
SAS OpRisk e-learning 
programme to offer 
companywide insight and 
training
SAS, the leader in business intelli-
gence, is improving operational risk 
management across the financial 
services industry with the launch of 
a new operational risk e-learning 
programme. The first course of its 
kind, it was developed with a steer-
ing committee of financial services 
industry representatives from the 
investment banking, insurance and 
retail banking sectors following 
industry feedback that staff aware-
ness is the main weakness in opera-
tional risk management initiatives. 
With improved awareness, employ-
ees at all levels are able to better 
respond and react to operational 
risks within the organisation.�������������